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LAW’S VIOLENCE AND THE BOUNDARY
BETWEEN CORPORAL DISCIPLINE AND
PHYSICAL ABUSE IN GERMAN SOUTH WEST
AFRICA
Harry Schwirck
“Were the inhibition against violence perfect, law would be
unnecessary; were it not capable of being overcome through social
signals, law would not be possible.”1
People generally see law and violence as antagonistic.2 In this
view, law serves to minimize violence in society and is no more coercive
than necessary. Violence is disruptive and by countering violence, law
contributes to social order. Applications of force by agents of the law
entail a necessary response to illegitimate violence.3 This legal violence,
then, is ultimately anti-violent, serving in the end to reduce the level of
violence in society overall. In this respect, law has a negative relation to
violence.
Robert Cover and others challenge this view, positing a positive or

1. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L. J. 1601, 1613 (1986).
2. I use the terms “violence,” “force,” and “coercion” to mean the application of physical
force; it will be clear from context when these words are used otherwise. I employ this usage to
distinguish the use of physical force from forms of suasion or coercion that lack physical force, such
as discipline.
3. As used in this article, “law” does not just mean the law contained in legal codes, derived
from custom, or established by precedent. Rather, a more expansive view of law is indicated:
“When the state’s agents apply their understanding of law and bring to bear the specter and reality
of force and violence that is the state’s, this is the state’s law.” THOMAS ROSS, JUST STORIES: HOW
THE LAW EMBODIES RACISM AND BIAS 6 (1996). Law in this view encompasses the actions taken
in the expression and execution of law by everyone who administers law. For the problems in
defining law see, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 1 (1994) (providing a comprehensive
discussion of the function of the law); HERMANN KANTOROWICZ, THE DEFINITION OF LAW 1 (A.H.
Campbell ed., Octagon Books 1980) (discussing the philosophy of the law generally); and Laura
Nader, The Anthropological Study of Law, in LAW AND ANTHROPOLOGY 3 (Peter Sack & Jonathan
Aleck eds., 1992) (providing a discussion of the main themes about law that have concerned
anthropologists).
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generative relation between law and violence.4 Cover argues that
physical sanction ultimately underlies any legal system. “A legal world
is built only to the extent that there are commitments that place bodies
on the line.”5 For Cover, if law were not embedded in a system that
implements its, sometimes violent, commands, then it would not be law
at all.6
This article explores another positive relationship between law and
violence. Law does not merely respond to violence in an effort to
diminish it but also determines and reflects what might be termed an
economy of violence. Law plays a central role in defining what a
society will recognize as violence and in allocating the ability to
legitimately act in a violent manner.
This positive relationship between law and violence can be seen
most readily in instances in which legitimate and illegitimate violence
shade into one another, because then each partakes the most of the other.
This article examines one such instance in detail. During German
colonial rule over South West Africa (present day Namibia),7 the
contradictory tendencies in law’s relationship to violence played
themselves out in the response of law and legal institutions to settlers’
violence against Africans. The physical abuse of Africans—usually
workers—at the hands of settlers was a regular feature of the colony’s
4. See Cover, supra note 1, at 1601, passim (“Legal interpretation takes place in a field of
pain and death.”); Robert Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 40 (1983) (“But the
jurisgenerative principle by which legal meaning proliferates in all communities never exists in
isolation from violence. Interpretation always takes place in the shadow of coercion.”); WALTER
BENJAMIN, Critique of Violence, in REFLECTIONS 281, 283 (Peter Demtz ed., Edmund Jephcott
trans., 1978) (“If, therefore, conclusions can be drawn from military violence, as being primordial
and paradigmatic of all violence used for natural ends, there is inherent in all such violence a
lawmaking character.”); Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, A Journey Through Forgetting: Toward
a Jurisprudence of Violence, in THE FATE OF LAW 209, 212 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns
eds., 1991) (“In our view, any theory of law must locate violence at the center of its concerns”).
5. Cover, supra note 1, at 1605.
6. See id. at 1613, 1617.
7. Throughout this article I refer to present-day Namibia as South West Africa or German
Southwest Africa (a practice uncomfortably shared by Afrikaners with quasi-irredentist sentiments).
My reason for this is simply to avoid confusion because my sources almost invariably use the name
“South West Africa.” In places in which it is obvious that I am referring to either early Namibian
nationalism or to present-day Namibia, I will use the word Namibia. Although I also use the word
“native” without scare quotes throughout the article, they are always intended. “Natives”
[Eingeborenen] or “Blacks” are the words that appear throughout the primary sources, and I use
them only to paraphrase the attitudes and sentiments therein. Otherwise I use the term Africans or
Namibians, which seems more appropriate in this case. When I am referring to a specific African
people, I will use their tribal name, for example, “Herero” or “Nama.” Interestingly, most primary
sources use the word “African” only to mean European settlers of Africa, but this usage is
infrequent. Where the document uses the term “whites,” I use it as well. Otherwise, I attempt to
substitute a more specific name such as “Germans” or “settlers.”
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social landscape.8 Legal institutions and colonial officials vacillated
between treating this abuse as criminal assault and as an exercise of “the
right to paternal discipline [väterliches Züchtigungsrecht].” Ultimately,
colonial law accommodated settlers’ violent treatment of Africans by
recognizing it as a type of extralegal yet legitimate violence.
This article is organized as follows. Part One sketches the way the
article will approach the issue of law and violence. Part Two provides a
very brief summary of the history of German colonial rule in South West
Africa. Part Three discusses the status of the right of discipline in
German law up to and during the colonial period. Part Four turns to the
colonial situation itself, examining the colonial debate over the right to
discipline in the context of settlers’ abuse of farm workers. Part Five
follows this debate into the diamond mines discovered toward the end of
the German colonial period and mined by African migrant workers
under frequently abusive foremen.
I. LAW AND VIOLENCE
Law is usually seen as opposed in spirit to violence generally, and
the relation between the two is assumed to be negative. In this view, the
state’s monopoly on legitimate violence renders society less violent
overall.9 This view accords with a part of the classical liberal tradition,
which offers a myth of the state’s10 origin from a state of nature. In the
state of nature—at least after a pre-scarcity Edenic interlude—
individuals preyed on one another. To secure life and property against
each another, people “agreed” to subject themselves to the coercive
practices of a state.11 According to this founding myth, then, the state’s
8. See, e.g., HELMUT BLEY, SOUTH-WEST AFRICA UNDER GERMAN RULE 1894-1914, at
266-67 (Hugh Ridley trans., 1971) (discussing the political, social, and economic systems of
German South-West Africa); HORST DRECHSLER, LET US DIE FIGHTING: THE STRUGGLE OF THE
HERERO AND NAMA AGAINST GERMAN IMPERIALISM (1884-1915), at 234-37 (Bernd Zöllner trans.,
Zed Press 1980) (discussing the physical abuse used by Germans against the native population).
9. Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 78
(H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., Oxford University Press 1946) (1919) (defining the state as “a
human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force”).
10. Throughout this article I use “state” to mean the modern state under the rule of law.
11. For example, while explicitly rejecting social contract theory, John Stuart Mill derives
state authority from the individual’s reciprocal obligation engendered by the protection offered by
society. In return for this protection, an individual has a duty to “observe a certain line of conduct
towards the rest.” ON LIBERTY 70 (David Spitz ed., 1975). Mill writes that this conduct includes
not only one’s own behavior toward another, but also the obligation to support a policing function.
See also, JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 32-33 (Thomas P. Peardon ed.,
Bobbs-Merrill 1952) (1690) (“For liberty is to be free from restraint and violence from others,
which cannot be where there is not law; but freedom is not, as we are told: a liberty for every man to
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monopoly on violence remedies the more violent individual predations
in a state of nature.
Criminal law provides the paradigmatic example of the state’s
violence in this traditional view. Here, the state employs coercive
measures against members of society who commit violence against other
members.12 Admittedly, very few would care to live in a society that did
not police violence in this way—indeed, this policing function, in part,
constitutes society itself. However, the liberal tradition only views such
violence as a potential problem if it surpasses the minimum necessary
for maintaining the negative space of individual liberty.13 Kept at the
level sufficient to maintain internal order and external defense, the
state’s violence seems unexceptionable.
The liberal description of the origin and extent of the state’s
coercive power in many respects parallels that of much more critical
internalization theories. For example, in The Civilizing Process, Norbert
Elias showed, through a discussion of the development of table manners,
how outward directed violence gave way to internalized norms of
behavior.14 Social control became less a matter of direct coercion and
more a matter of socialization.15 Michel Foucault, of course, has
described this process extensively, in his many descriptions of the
process of social discipline. Foucault rejects the idea of enlightened
progress in, for example, the punishment of crime, the treatment of the
insane, and the liberation of sexuality.16 Instead, he reinterprets what
do what he lists . . . but a liberty to dispose and order as he lists his person, actions, possessions, and
his whole property, within the allowance of those laws under which he is, and therein not to be
subject to the arbitrary will of another, but freely follow his own.”).
12. Criminal law, of course, accomplishes far more than policing violence. See Stuart A.
Scheingold, Constructing the New Political Criminology: Power, Authority, and the Post-Liberal
State, 23 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 857, 859 (1998) (providing an overview of the field of political
criminology, which “focus[es] on the nature and the distribution of power as it shapes the social and
political construction of crime and influences crime control policies”).
13. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 28 (Alexander Hamilton) (justifying the state’s use of
force as a response “to preserve the peace of the community and to maintain the just authority of the
laws against those violent invasions of them which amount to insurrections and rebellions”).
14. See NORBERT ELIAS, THE CIVILIZING PROCESS: THE HISTORY OF MANNERS 1 (Edmund
Jephcott trans., Urizen Books 1978) (1939) (discussing the relationship between violence and
normative behavior).
15. Id. at 257 (“The transformation of interpersonal external compulsion into individual
internal compulsion . . . leads to a situation in which many affective impulses cannot be lived out as
spontaneously as before. The autonomous individual self-controls produced in this way in social
life, such as ‘rational thought’ or the ‘moral conscience,’ now interpose themselves more sternly
than ever before between spontaneous and emotional impulses, on the one hand, and the skeletal
muscles, on the other, preventing the former with greater severity from directly determining the
latter (i.e., action) without the permission of these control mechanism.”).
16. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 302 (Alan
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most take to be progress as an ever-increasing articulation of internalized
means of social control—the body’s saturation with discursive power
structures.17 The internalization of powers minimizes the need for
authority to express itself through direct physical coercion.18 While
powerful and no doubt true, internalization theory often fails to account
for not only the persistence, but also the increasing magnitude of
outward expressions of violence.
Construing law’s violence as secondary to its discipline, however,
obscures the ways in which violence and law are more intimately bound.
The historian Alf Lüdtke points out “the simultaneity of the physically
violent character of the ‘modern state’ and the symbolic presence of this
violence—including within the forms of social reproduction.”19 That is,
violence has both a direct and indirect relation to law; both “hard” and
“soft” violence characterize the modern state and its laws. So the
development of law, like other forms of discipline, does not only entail
an increase in the internalization of laws’ norms and a corresponding
decrease in the physical expression or maintenance of the same through

Sheridan trans., 1979) (exploring the history of punishment from early modern times to the 20th
century); FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE AGE OF
REASON 1 (Richard Howard trans., 1965) (discussing the treatment of the insane); FOUCAULT, THE
HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 1 (Robert Hurley trans., 1978) (discussing the discourse of sexuality). See
also PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 191-97 (Richard Nice trans., 1977)
(describing how violence can be displaced in power structures by putatively universal cultural
values).
17. See, e.g., FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 16, at 11 (“Hence, too, my
main concern will be to locate the forms of power, the channels it takes, and the discourses it
permeates in order to reach the most tenuous and individual modes of behavior, the paths that give it
access to the rare or scarcely perceivable forms of desire, how it penetrates and controls everyday
pleasure—all this entailing effects that may be those of refusal, blockage, and invalidation, but also
incitement and intensification: in short, the ‘polymorphous techniques of power.’”).
18. See, e.g., FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 16, at 302 (“But, conversely,
the carceral pyramid gives to the power to inflict legal punishment a context in which it appears to
be free of all excess and all violence. In the subtle gradation of the apparatuses of discipline and of
the successive ‘embeddings’ that they involve, the prison does not at all represent the unleashing of
a different kind of power, but simply an additional degree in the intensity of a mechanism that has
continued to operate since the earliest forms of legal punishment.”). For a discussion of Foucault’s
concept of power in the context of legal scholarship, see Steven L. Winter, The “Power” Thing, 82
VA. L. REV. 721 (1996). Winter criticizes legal scholarship for either reifying power or reducing it
to the ability to apply force. He describes Foucault’s conception of power as a corrective that
“neither facilely subjectivizes power nor falsely elides agency.” Id. at 728. “For Foucault, sociocultural construction is an all-pervasive process from which no one escapes and in which everyone
participates. Power as such is neither a “thing” nor a quality, capacity, or possession of particular
people. Rather, power is an emergent quality that can only take shape through the joint agency of
all those who participate in a given set of social relations.” Id.
19. ALF LÜDTKE, POLICE AND STATE IN PRUSSIA, 1815-1850 8 (Peter Burgess trans., 1989)
(discussing state domination in transition to industrial capitalism).
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violence. Rather, the modern state under the rule of law also uses direct
force to achieve its ends. Lüdtke’s approach to law, like that of
internalization theory, remains instrumental. He relates law to the
“continuing necessity of extra-economic force for the safeguarding of
the production process (and social reproduction) both demonstratively
and in the abstract.”20
Anne Marie Smith also notes internalization theory’s inattention to
violence, writing that “[a]lthough Foucault asserts that bio-power fully
displaced sovereign power during the early modern period, we are now
witnessing the deployment of new forms of brutal subtractive power in
key points within complex Western societies.”21 Smith cites Foucault’s
“fail[ure] to give adequate attention to the presence of subtractive
strategies within contemporary disciplinary regimes.”22 As a corrective
to this gap in Foucauldian theory, Smith suggests “we should think
instead in terms of hybrid formations [of power] in which subtractive
modes—domination, exclusion, genocide and so on—are combined with
productive modes—the organization of consent.”23
A conception of law as fundamentally opposed to violence also
characterizes critical treatments of colonial law. In her review of this
field, Sally Engle Merry argues that colonial law had a dual nature.24 On
the one hand, colonial law had a disciplinary function, “reshap[ing]
culture and consciousness,” and advanced the material interests of
colonizers, “serv[ing] to extract land from precolonial users and to create
a wage labor force out of peasant and subsistence producers.”25 On the
other hand, and to a lesser extent, law provided a way for the colonized
to contest extractive colonial practices.26 Merry adds, “law provided a
way for the colonial state to restrain the more brutal aspects of settlers’

20. Id. Also, for Lüdtke law’s violence is atavistic in that we tend to associate its direct forms
of compulsion with older social institutions and practices, while viewing its “soft” forms as modern.
Id.
21. ANNA MARIE SMITH, LACLAU & MOUFFE: THE RADICAL DEMOCRATIC IMAGINARY 163
(1998) (providing an overview and critique of the work of Laclau and Mouffe).
22. Id. See also Sarat & Kearns, supra note 4, at 266 (“So long as critical legal theory seeks
only to expose the will and desire that inevitably are part of the interpretive task and rests content
with deconstructing law’s ideologies, we will be blind to the ways in which ideological oppression
ultimately depends on law’s monopoly of violence.”).
23. SMITH, supra note 21, at 163.
24. Sally Engle Merry, Law and Colonialism, 25 L. & SOC’Y REV. 889, 891 (1991)
(discussing the role of law in the colonizing process).
25. Id.
26. Id. (“[I]t provided a way for these groups to mobilize the ideology of the colonizers to
protect lands and to resist some of the more excessive demands of the settlers for land and labor.”).
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exploitation of land and labor.”27 We will see below, that while colonial
law may have constrained some colonial violence, it also domesticated,
redefined, and enabled such violence.
This article departs from both liberal and internalization theories in
that it does not understand the modern state under the rule of law as a
turn away from violence. Rather, the state represents a particular way of
organizing and distributing violence.
This thesis enables an
understanding of some of the modern era’s most salient events—state
sponsored acts of violence like war, genocide, depression, and avoidable
famine—as something other than exceptional. This thesis must take
violence’s irreducibility as its starting point, but this assumption appears
unobjectionable, at least as a matter of historical fact.28
This article also departs from many discussions of legitimate
violence in that it does not take this violence as primarily instrumental.29
While violence no doubt has instrumental uses, it is essentially irrational
with respect to power structures. That is, even legitimate violence does
not necessarily serve rational interests, nor is it purely a matter of
discipline. In fact, as we will see, in South West Africa the colonial
government allowed and enabled violence that undermined colonial
interests.
II. THE COLONIAL CONTEXT
The main groupings of peoples in 19th century Namibia were the
Ovambo, the Berg-Damara, the Herero, the Nama, and the “Bushmen.”30
The Ovambo, who lived in the far north of the territory near the border
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., BARBARA EHRENREICH, BLOOD RITES: ORIGINS AND HISTORY OF THE
PASSIONS OF WAR (1997) (providing a fascinating account of the violence’s universality and
persistence).
29. See, e.g., Laura E. Gomez, Race, Colonialism, and Criminal Law: Mexicans and the
American Criminal Justice System in Territorial New Mexico, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1129, 1133
(2000) (arguing that “racial power sharing” in the administration of the criminal justice system in
territorial New Mexico served the interests of Mexican and European-American elites); Robert P.
Ingalls, Lynching and Establishment Violence in Tampa, 1858-1935, 53 J.S. HIST. 613 (1987)
available at http://www.jstor.org (tying the rise and fall of lynching to changing economic
interests).
30. The demo/ethno-graphics of 19th century Namibia were complicated and are confusing,
in parts thanks to changing conventions of nomination. This article will use Europeanized rather
than Xhosian spellings of places and people, since this is the practice of most of my sources. Robert
Gordon argues that the somewhat pejorative name “bushmen” should be retained in favor of more
ethnologically accurate names, such as San, because the latter names divide a group that colonial
oppression consigned to a common fate and resistance. See ROBERT GORDON, THE BUSHMAN
MYTH: THE MAKING OF A NAMIBIAN UNDERCLASS 4-8 (1992) (discussing the politics of labeling
bushmen).
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of Angola, remained isolated from the other groups and German
occupiers until late in the first decade of the 20th century when they
were hired as migrant mine workers. Mostly concentrated in the
Northeastern part of Namibia, the “Bushmen” do not seem to have
played a role in the events with which I am concerned. The BergDamara apparently had been assimilated by groups of Herero and Nama
who had moved into their territory, displacing and sometimes enslaving
them.31 These last two groups, who played the greatest role vis-à-vis
German colonialism, had themselves occupied the territory in earlier
times. The Herero had migrated from the north centuries before; the
Nama were more recent arrivals from the south. The many Nama
communities could be grouped into two larger units: the Nama proper,
who had settled in Namibia much earlier, and the Oorlam Nama, who
migrated to Namibia in the nineteenth century. The Oorlam Nama had
moved to Namibia from the south to escape servitude on Boer towns and
farms and were often of mixed African and European descent.32 These
groups seemed quickly to have gained dominant positions in Nama
politics. In the 1880’s, the Herero dominated the country north of
Windhoek; Nama groups held sway in the South. These two most
powerful nations in the territory colonized by Germany fought one
another throughout the century and again in the early part of the
decade.33
Excluding the earlier presence of missionaries, German
involvement in Namibia lasted from 1884-1915. The German colonial
period can be divided into four phases. During the period from German
“acquisition” of South West Africa until the submission of Hendrik
Witbooi in 1894, Africans remained by and large independent of
German rule.34 Expansion of German territory and administration
depended on the sufferance of African communities. The end of
Witbooi’s original struggle with the Germans in 1894 marked the start of
German military and administrative consolidation of power under the
governorship of Theodor Leutwein.35 With Witboois often fighting
31. See, e.g., Max Schmidt, Die Nama, Bergdama und Namib-Buschleute, in 2 DAS
EINGEBORENENRECHT: SITTEN UND GEWOHNHEITSRECHTE DER EINGEBORENEN DER EHEMALIGEN
DEUTSCHEN KOLONIEN IN AFRIKA UND IN DER SÜDSEE 273 (Erich Schultz-Ewerth & Leonhard
Adam eds., 1930).
32. Brigitte Lau, Introduction to THE HENDRIK WITBOOI PAPERS iii-iv (Brigitte Lau ed.,
1990). One of the last of these groups to migrate, in fact, were called Rehoboth Basters (bastards).
33. See J.H. ESTERHUYSE, SOUTH WEST AFRICA 1880-1894: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
GERMAN AUTHORITY IN SOUTH WEST AFRICA 35-36 (1968) (discussing the Herero-Nama War).
34. Id.
35. See Denkschrift über Eingeborenenpolitik und Hereroaufstand in Deutsch-Südwestafrika
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alongside of them, the Germans put down uprisings among and forced
treaties on many Nama communities. Dependent on German support
against his rivals and paid handsomely for his acquiescence to German
rule, Herero leader Samuel Maharero also cooperated with the
colonizers.36 Herero loss of property during this time, in part through
coerced indebtedness to German traders and in part through a rinderpest
epidemic, provided the conditions for the Herero uprising in 1904.37
During the third phase (1904-7), the Herero and Nama revolted
separately against German rule. Around 85% of the Herero and about
half of the Nama, including Hendrik Witbooi, were killed or died as a
result of the effects of these revolts.38 The methods employed by the
Germans to put down the uprising, and especially the “Extermination
Order” of Leutwein’s replacement General Lothar von Trotha, have
since gained notoriety as particularly brutal colonial practices.39 The
period from 1907 until Germany lost its colonies in World War I saw the
partial dissolution of African communities, a system of forced labor for
most Africans, and the imprisonment or deportation of many others.
The use of corporal punishment by private citizens was common in
German South West Africa. White employers and foremen, on farms
and in mines, regularly “disciplined” native workers. Inevitably “the
6, 518 STENOGRAPHISCHE BERICHTE DES REICHESTAGES, 11 Legislatur-Periode I (1903/1905)
[hereinafter Denkschrift]. Leutwein is necessarily a major figure in any treatment of German
colonialism in South West Africa. See DRECHSLER, supra note 8, passim; BLEY, supra note 8,
passim. Leutwein’s own memoir of his governorship is THEODOR LEUTWEIN, ELF JAHRE
GOUVERNEUR IN DEUTSCH-SÜDWESTAFRIKA passim (1907).
36. The Herero leader Samuel Maharero’s part in squandering tribal property is discussed in
Gerhardus Pool’s book, SAMUEL MAHARERO. E.g. GERHARD POOL, SAMUEL MAHARERO 115-17
(1991).
37. See DRECHSLER, supra note 8, at 117-19. See also BLEY, supra note 8, at 124.
38. DRECHSLER, supra note 8, at 214. The Herero are currently seeking restitution from the
German government for German actions in South West Africa. See Sidney L. Harring, German
Reparations To The Herero Nation: An Assertion Of Herero Nationhood In The Path Of Namibian
Development?, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 393 (2002).
39. The German actions during the uprisings are often, and I believe correctly, described as
genocidal. See Jeremy Silvester et al., The Herero Holocaust? The Disputed History Of The 1904
Genocide, available at http://www.namibweb.com/hererohol.htm (“Today there almost seems to be
a consensus that the genocide really did happen.”). See also JON M. BRIDGMAN, THE REVOLT OF
THE HEREROS (1981) (providing an account of German violence against the Herero). Some
progressive scholars have taken issue with this characterization. See Brigitte Lau, Uncertain
certainties: The Herero-German war of 1904, MIBAGUS: JOURNAL OF FREE THOUGH AND
CULTURE,
April
1989,
at
4-6
&
8,
available
at
http://www.traditionsverband.de/magazin/ungewiss.html (discussing German atrocities). Tilman
Dedering rebuts Lau’s argument in The German-Herero War of 1904: Revisionism of Genocide or
Imaginary Historiography?, J. OF S. AFRN. STUD. 80 (1993) (discussing the German-Herero War).
Silvester et al. have more recently described the late Lau’s arguments as “largely discredited.”
Silvester, supra.
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right to paternal discipline” became an issue in the continuing debate
about native policy. In Germany this right had no certain legal status
outside of schools and the home, but in the colony few settlers or
administrators questioned it.40 Rather, it was excesses in the exercise of
discipline that sparked controversy—controversy over where discipline
ended and criminal abuse [Mißhandlung] began. Ultimately these
disputes fractured into contradictory legal claims about the status of
native workers, and indeed all natives, in colonial society.
Administrators generally viewed the treatment of native workers as a
public issue, to be regulated by colonial officials and limited by the
German criminal code. Employers, on the other hand, saw the issue as
an essentially private one, involving their rights under civil law to
manage their businesses as they wished. This distinction proved crucial
because while the criminal code allowed no apparent room for unequal
victims (the characteristics of the victim did not affect the nature of the
crime), civil rights and obligations varied according to status. In the
colony, in other words, the law made no explicit distinction between
natives and whites as crime victims, while the two group’s civil status
differed greatly. Colonial administrators’, courts’, and newspapers’
handling of salient cases of abused native workers involved negotiating
the disposition of status under different realms of law. The nearest thing
to a consensus in legal practice resulting from these controversies was
the understanding that cases of excessive discipline would prompt
criminal prosecution, but that in such cases natives indeed would not be
accorded the full status of victim implicit in the criminal code. Whether
engaged by criminal or civil law, natives occupied a position unequal to
whites.
Why did this compromise come about? What function did it serve?
Several possible answers present themselves. The first answer posits the
practice of discipline by settlers as a quasi-police authority, functioning
to increase settler security. The second answer proposes that colonial
discipline served as a means to control and discipline labor, that is, it
benefited the various German economic interests in the colony.
However, if we search for the threshold between discipline and abuse in
the colony, we find it beyond where the need for security or disciplining
labor might have established it. There was an excess in the colonial
practice of discipline that escapes these two categories. Here colonial
40. Though corporal discipline still occurred in the military, there it was on uncertain legal
footing.
See REINHART KOSELLECK, PREUßEN ZWISCHEN REFORM UND REVOLUTION:
ALLGEMEINE LANDRECHT, VERWALTUNG UND SOZIALE BEWEGUNG VON 1791 BIS 1848 655-59
(1967).
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ideology itself must be accorded explanatory priority, and corporal
discipline seen first and foremost as a way to realize and perpetuate a
racially differentiated social structure. Casting settlers’ violence against
Africans as something other than violence was one expression of this
differentiation.
In the next section, I will examine the arguments of the various
participants in the colonial debate over the boundary between discipline
and abuse. The first part of this section will highlight the legal issues
inherent in the “right to paternal discipline” and trace its historical
development in modern German law up to the colonial period. The next
part turns to the application of the right to discipline (right to discipline)
in German colonies—particularly in South West Africa—and the brief
and incomplete debate that accompanied it. The final part entails a close
reading of a particular case involving the abuse of African mine workers
and the resultant controversies beyond the courtroom.
III. RIGHT TO DISCIPLINE AND THE PRUSSIAN LAW OF DOMESTICS
A. Right to Discipline and Criminal Abuse.
The central legal issue raised by a right to discipline is how to
distinguish lawful discipline from criminal abuse.41 The German
Imperial Criminal Code [Strafgesetzbuch, hereafter StGB], promulgated
in 1870, defined the crime of common assault in this manner: “Anyone
who intentionally does injury to the body or health of another shall be
guilty of assault and liable to confinement not exceeding three years or
to a fine not exceeding one thousand marks.”42
This definition—particularly the criterion of deliberateness—left
jurists considerable leeway in determining what acts were to be
considered abuse. Jurist could apply either descriptive or normative
criteria in making this determination. Descriptive criteria might focus
on either subjective or objective facts of the case. These criteria invoke,
respectively, the nature of the action without regard to its results or the
effect of the action on its target. Citing a scholarly consensus around the
41. My discussion here is indebted to DIETHELM KIENAPFEL, KÖRPERLICHE ZÜCHTIGUNG
ADÄQUANZ IM STRAFRECHT passim (1961). Like most modern jurists writing about
the right to discipline, Kienapfel focuses on corporal punishment in schools. Nonetheless, his
methodical presentation of the subject provides a nice overview of the legal issues and literature
relating to the right to discipline. Id.
42. StGB § 223 (1871). The following sections define and set penalties for assault with a
weapon, assault resulting in grievous bodily harm. These types of assault carry greater penalties,
but the basic definition of assault—the intent to injure—remains the same.

UND SOZIALE
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definition of abuse as “an improper, severe, ill-intended treatment [ein
unangemessenes, schlimmes, übles Behandeln],” Diethelm Kienapfel
remarks that “severe [schlimm]” corresponds to the objective nature of
the crime, “ill-intended [übel]” to its subjective nature.43 All acts of
discipline would be included under a strictly descriptive concept of
abuse; discipline is deliberate by nature. In contrast, the adjective
“improper [unangemessen]” points to a normative definition of abuse.
Such a definition becomes necessary, the common argument goes,
because certain actions, like discipline, that clearly meet the descriptive
criteria of criminal abuse are just as clearly not considered abuse in their
broader social context. A popular analogy here is with surgery. This
analogy is far from innocent because it allows a legally and socially
controversial issue, corporal punishment in schools, to be placed in an
area of near social unanimity, the efficacy of invasive surgery.
The admission of normative criteria into the definition of criminal
abuse, as well as other crimes, alters the balance between the nature of
the act (subjective and/or objective) and the intentions of the actor. This
legal position at the fulcrum, which Kienapfel describes as the “dualistic
concept” of abuse, ideally allows the educative use of corporal
punishment while describing its limits: viciousness in the application of
discipline or injury to the body.44 However, legal practice, particularly
in the colony, could not maintain this equilibrium. Once intention
became central for colonial jurists in the determination of criminality,
the statutory limits to the exercise of the right of discipline potentially
lost relevance. While excesses of discipline still might be clearly
recognized by courts, the defendant’s intent to commit a crime assumed
a central role. In all cases, the courts regularly considered ignorance of
an act’s illegality to provide partial or complete exoneration. Still,
(un)awareness of illegality proved especially relevant to discipline/abuse
cases because the law recognized a category of physical assault
(discipline) as legitimate. Merely claiming to have exercised right to
discipline suggested one’s intentions had not been illegal.
A case decided in 1880 by the Reichsgericht, the German high
court, illustrates the difficulties in clearly defining the threshold between
corporal punishment and criminal abuse. The case involved a teacher
43. KIENAPFEL, supra note 41, at 28-29.
44. Injury to honor is also relevant to the issues of both bodily discipline and criminal abuse.
The Prussian Law of Domestics stated that the physical punishment of a servant was not to be seen
as an injury to his honor. A child’s honor, too, seems to have been unaffected by discipline, while
the honor of natives appears never to have been addressed by colonial courts, administrators, or
jurists.
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who, in disciplining a boy, had “gone beyond the appropriate measure”
without, however, causing permanent injury to the boy’s health.45 The
lower court acquitted the teacher on the grounds that the state of Lippe’s
law governing schools called for criminal prosecution of acts of
excessive discipline only if they caused lasting injury to the student’s
health. Other instances of over-zealous punishment would be handled
by school officials. The Reichsgericht rejected this reasoning, asserting
instead that the StGB superseded state law, and therefore only it,
unconstrained by any state statute, provided the definitions of crimes.
Because such a literalist interpretation of the StBG would leave no room
for any legal discipline, the high court swiftly retreated. “The
presupposition of punishability,” it wrote in the same opinion,
is illegality; so long as state law, within its jurisdiction, grants officials
the right to dicipline, such an act, in the execution [of state law] and
within the bounds of the same, does not fall under criminal law, even if
it presents itself objectively as assault in the sense of the Penal Code.46

Here, the court allowed state law to limit the StGB; the former
could define discipline—its means, objects, and occasions—which
would not then be considered illegal and actionable under the criminal
law. The criminal code and criminal process would become relevant
only when the limits of right to discipline had been transgressed. This
allocation of law-making authority, presented by the Reichsgericht as an
assertion of the StGB’s preeminence, actually conceded to states the
power to define criminal assault independently of criminal law.
One reason the court could not find solid ground is that its decision
spanned several areas of law. Right to Discipline, might stem from
administrative law (for state employees), private law (for parents and
45. RGSt 5 (1880), 10(10). “[H]at der angeklagte Lehrer bei der Züchtigung des Knaben G.
das rechte Maß uberschritten; indessen ist die Züchtigung für die Gesundheit des Knaben ohne jede
nachteilige Folge geblieben.” Id. (Author’s translation: “Did the accused teacher’s discipline of the
Boy G. exceed the appropriate measure, inasmuch as no permanent damage to the boy’s health
resulted from it?”). “5. 1. Wie sind die dem Lehrer erlaubte, die bloß disciplinell strafbare
Züchtigung und die von dem Lehrer begangene strafbare Körperverletzung eines Schülers von
einander abzugrenzen?” Id. (Author’s translation: “5.1. How do you distinguish between those
things that the teacher is allowed to do, [excessive] discipline merely punishable by disciplinary
measures, and criminally punishable assault?”).
46. Id. at 12. This sentence amounted to a standard formula for such cases; see also RGSt 97
(1883) 302, 302 (“97. Steht die Nr. 6 der preußichen Kabinettsordre vom 14. Mai 1825 betr. die
Schulzucht (G.S.S. 149), nach welcher ein Mißbrauch des Züchtigungrechtes nur, wenn dem Kinde
eine wirkliche Verletzung zugefügt ist, an dem Lehrer im gerichtlichen Wege bestraft werden kann,
noch zu Recht?”) Id. (Author’s translation: “97. Is Nr. 6 of the Prussian Cabinet Order of May 14,
1825 concerning discipline in schools, according to which a teacher can be prosecuted by a court
only when an abuse of the right to discipline results in a real injury to the child, still valid law?”).
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private teachers), or even church law (for teachers in religious schools).
Thus, in discipline/abuse cases, criminal courts found themselves in the
peculiar position of having to decide the legality of statute in another
realm of law. In the present case, after seeming to leave the substance of
right to discipline for others to determine, the Reichsgericht reasserted
its prerogative to limit the right according to its reading of criminal law.
Right to Discipline, the court declared, must serve the “physical and
mental development of pupils” and “the scope of this right will be
determined and limited by this aim.”47 The consequences of discipline,
the severity and longevity of its marks on the student’s body, afforded
the means to judge whether or not the teacher had overstepped these
limits. “Discipline which threatens the [child’s] physical or mental
integrity lies outside the scope of the teacher’s permitted disciplinary
authority.”48 Having strayed beyond this authority, an accused teacher
could no longer call on right to discipline in his defense. In trying to set
the boundary of criminal behavior, the court inevitably ended up
defining the goals and extent of a teacher’s prerogative to discipline
students under state law. This attempt merely represented the obverse of
the case’s original position to which the court objected: the limitations
on criminal prosecution set by state law.
The Reichsgericht resolved its dilemma by breaking the continuum
between discipline and abuse at a point determined by intentionality.
“[Discipline is] punishable as assault if the teacher knowingly
overstepped the right to discipline; that is, he was conscious that his act
was excessive.”49 The court stressed the actor’s intentions; he had
committed a crime if “he disciplined in order to mistreat.”50 This
emphasis provided a logical solution to the problem, but failed on a
practical level to address those very same borderline discipline/abuse
cases at issue to begin with. Intention may be easy to determine in
extreme cases of abuse; claims to have been merely exercising right to
discipline can be readily dismissed if, for example, a teacher stabbed or
shot a student. However, such claims cannot be easily decided, or
decided at all, in liminal cases of abuse. One can easily imagine a
teacher, who in anger hit a child too many times or with a stick instead
of a switch or on the back instead of the hands, plausibly claiming not to
have properly understood the legal limits of right to discipline, as settlers
accused of criminal assault against natives often did in South West
47.
48.
49.
50.

RGSt 5 at 13 (“[D]ie körperliche und geistige Entwicklung des Zöglings. . . .”).
Id. at 14.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15 (“[E]r züchtigt, um zu mißhandeln.”).
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Africa.
B. The Historical Development of Right to Discipline in Prussian Law
of Domestics [Gesinderecht].
Tracing the historical and legal development of right to discipline
with an eye to its application in the colony proves a somewhat less
straightforward task than it might seem at first glance. The difficulty
arises from colonial jurists’ failure to ground the right legally—at least
in regard to the discipline of workers—in any clear way. Colonial courts
merely asserted the existence of right to discipline without explicating its
legal basis. This tactic appeared necessary in light of contemporary
developments in metropolitan law. These developments cast serious
doubt on the right to discipline of anyone except teachers and parents.
Thus, the real legal foundation for the colonial right to discipline lay in
all but obsolete laws of the early nineteenth century. Of course, at that
time there was no German national state and thus no German law per se,
raising the question of which of the German states’ laws concerning
discipline were relevant to the colonial situation. For a number of
reasons, I will trace the development of right to discipline in Prussian
law, except where the law of the united Germany still clearly recognized
this right. Without doubt this choice is the most practical, since much
nineteenth-century German history focuses on Prussia, but it is also most
appropriate on a substantive level. According to the Schutzgebietgesetz,
Prussian law served as the “default” law of the colonies.51 In other
words, the legal areas in which individual German states as opposed to
the federal government had jurisdiction would be governed in the
colonies by Prussian laws. The legitimacy of right to discipline in
Prussian law was therefore relevant to colonial law since the applicable
law of domestics there would have been Prussian Law of Domestics.
Further, both the StGB and the German Civil Code [Bürgerliches
Gesetzbuch, hereafter BGB] derived in large part from the earlier
Prussian criminal and civil codes. In a sense, the development of right
to discipline in the modern period began in Prussian law and culminated
in the codification of German law after 1871. And last, in the
development of right to discipline, the other German states seemed to

51. See SCHUTZGEBIETSGESETZ § 3. The Schutzgebietsgesetz was the legal code applicable
in the German colonies. It is published in its entirety in, among other places, WILHELM HÖPFNER,
DAS SCHUTZGEBIETSGESETZ UND SEINE ERGÄNZENDEN RECHTLICHEN BESTIMMUNGEN (1907);
ERNST RADLAUER, ÜBER DEN UMFANG DER GELTUNG DES PREUßISCHEN RECHTS IN DEN
DEUTSCHEN SCHUTZGEBIETEN passim (1911).
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have followed a path similar to Prussia’s. Excepting local peculiarities,
the history of right to discipline and law of domestics in Prussia can be
seen as representative for all of Germany.
Nineteenth-century German law recognized right to discipline in a
number of areas, which can be broken into two subsets.52 The first of
these involved the use of discipline as tool for a child’s formation and
education [Bildung and Erziehung] and was possessed by teachers,
fathers, and their proxies. (Mothers, for example, could exercise
discipline in the father’s absence.) At the turn of the century, this
pedagogical use of discipline derived for parents from the BGB and, as
we have seen, for teachers from various state laws. The second category
of discipline was corporal discipline as punishment more strictly
speaking. This type of discipline became limited over the course of the
nineteenth century and, with the exception of the death penalty,
eventually disappeared. This category included the right of police
authorities to punish minor delicts with clearly defined physical
punishment without recourse to criminal process.53 Physical discipline
also constituted a criminal punishment in Prussia until 1851, when it was
written out of the criminal code and the criminal code for all of Germany
that followed it in 1871.54
A master’s right to discipline servants fell between these two
categories. The historian Reinhart Koselleck, writing about the early
nineteenth century, placed it squarely alongside a father’s right to
discipline, but at the latest with the publication of the BGB, the now
disputed right to discipline servants became distinct from the paternal
right to discipline. The legal inclusion of servants and workers on
estates in the households of their employers may have been appropriate
in a society ordered by social groups [Stände], but it became
increasingly out of date over the course of the nineteenth century as
these workers became citizens, in theory considered equals under the
52. See KOSELLECK, supra note 40, at 641-59. Viewing the right to discipline from the end
of the 19th century, my categoriztion differs somewhat from Koselleck’s. He described three (and a
half) levels of discipline at the beginning of the century. The right to “hausherrlichen Gewalt,” the
use of corporal discipline by police and in the military as punishment for minor offenses, corporal
discipline as a criminal penalty, and (the half) the technically illegal but continuing use of discipline
to coerce confession. Id. The first category included fathers’ and teachers’ right to discipline
children, as well as masters’ right to discipline servants, legally considered part of the household
broadly conceived. Id.
53. Id. at 653-55. Koselleck points out the difficulty of distinguishing in some rural areas this
police authority from “hausherrlichen Gewalt,” since estate-owners often also acted as police and
judges. Id.
54. Id. at 655-56. The Prussian military no longer legally sanctioned corporal punishment
after 1808, but some officers continued to physically discipline soldiers nonetheless. Id.
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law. A legal position for servants unequal with and subordinate to their
employers grew ever more incongruous with the law’s declining
recognition of status and eventually became untenable. With the BGB’s
voiding of employers’ and codification of fathers’ right to discipline,
these rights were clearly separated.55 An employer’s right to discipline
continued to be justified in paternalistic (educative) terms, but such
arguments grew increasingly cynical. Even for the period discussed by
Koselleck, employers’ right to discipline concerned order [Ordnung] at
least as much as education [Erziehung], punishment as much as
discipline. In South West Africa, though arguments about right to
discipline were often couched in terms of Erziehung, customary practice
included few paternal or reciprocal obligations of settlers toward their
native workers. In fact, even contractual obligations seemed to have
been widely ignored in the colony. The ambiguity of an employer’s
Zuchtigungsrecht, its datedness, and its deliberately murky legality all
made it peculiarly suited to application to indigenous colonial subjects
who had uncertain legal standing. A brief sketch of the Prussian Law of
Domestics’ disposition of right to discipline shows how this legal
confusion developed around the right and its standing at the time of
German colonialism.
The Prussian General Law of 1794 [Allgemeines Landrecht,
hereafter ALR] provided the basis for Prussian Law of Domestics
(1810), which was seen as granting the right to discipline in two ways:
the so-called “direct” and “indirect” right to discipline. Although the
exact scope of the law of domestics was not entirely clear, servants
basically included servants both inside and outside of the house and
indentured agricultural workers, as opposed to day laborers
[Tagelöhner].56 Section 227 of the ALR [Section] II granted the socalled “direct right to discipline.” This paragraph gave employers the
right “to hold lazy, disorderly, and rebellious servants to their duty
through moderate discipline.”57
Section 227 proved controversial from its promulgation in 1791 and
particularly after the emancipation of peasants in [Bauernbefreiung]
1807, the spirit of which it directly contradicted. Law was moving in the
direction of representing all (adult male) members of society as equals
and citizens, while § 227 clearly belonged to a law that ordered society
55. I will explain below why an employer’s right to discipline continued to exist despite its
nullification by the BGB.
56. THOMAS VORMBAUM, POLITIK UND GESINDERECHT IM 19 JAHRHUNDERT 26-34 (1980).
57. Id. at 86 (“[F]aules, unordentliches und widerspenstiges Gesinde . . . durch mäßige
Züchtigungen zu seiner Pflicht anzuhalten”).
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by status groups [Stände]. Section 227 owed its continued existence to
an apparent compromise between reformist bureaucrats and conservative
estate owners. Representatives of these interests agreed that right to
discipline contradicted the spirit of the Rechtsstaat [state under the rule
of law] and the new civil society, but it remained necessary since
servants were still unable to participate as equals in civil society.58 This
view held corporal discipline doubly necessary: in the absence of a
society of equals and as a means of educating servants to such a society.
One hundred years later, such reasons for delaying servants’
achievement of legal equality had much less credibility; a different law
for servants and “masters” violated the notion of legal equality central to
the Rechtsstaat. Consequently, the recognition of right to discipline in
the colonies reestablished within the Rechtsstaat, but on a new footing,
the ständisch “master and servant” relationship.
Despite local rulings against it, for instance in Westphalia in 1825,
§ 227 remained in effect until 1860 when the Prussian Upper Court
[Obertribunal] nullified it.59 In 1899, Article 95 of the Introductory Act
to the BGB definitively eradicated all “direct right to discipline”: “A
legitimate employer does not possess the right to discipline vis-à-vis
servants.” The primary concern of this article was to maintain the
existing law of domestics. Such law often restricted the rights of
servants as compared with other workers and granted the employers of
servants rights unavailable to other employers.60 This disposition of
rights resulted in the restriction of servants’ freedom to enter into
contracts.
Despite these conservative elements, Article 95 did
unequivocally outlaw right to discipline. Nonetheless, an indirect right
to discipline, while controversial, continued to be recognized by some
courts until the end of Imperial Germany.
Enough powerful
conservative elements remained in German society at the turn of the
century to keep alive privileges of rank, like right to discipline.61
The indirect right to discipline stemmed from II ALR § 77 (dating
back to 1794). This paragraph stated:
If the servant by improper behavior provokes the master to anger and

58. See KOSELLECK, supra note 40, at 641-59.
59. Id. at 88-89.
60. MICHAEL JOHN, POLITICS AND THE LAW IN LATE NINETEENTH-CENTURY GERMANY: THE
ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL CODE 96 (1989) (discussing the approach to codification). For example,
servants were denied the right to form coalitions, a right granted to other workers by the Industrial
Code. Id.
61. For a discussion of the interplay between the Rechtsstaat and Ständisch relations in
Prussia, see LÜDTKE, supra note 19.
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as a result is upbraided or handled a little violently, [the servant] can
demand no legal redress for this [treatment].

The inclusion of this paragraph in the ALR and in the Prussian Law
of Domestics represented another compromise between conservative and
reformist impulses. With § 227 and the direct right to discipline under
attack and likely to be repealed, § 77 was meant to reassure “masters”
that they had not lost all control over servants. For the legal reformer
Carl Gottlieb Svarez,
[This] clause is prudently written so that it takes the correct middle
way between both extremes and leaves enough room to arbitrio
iudicis, which will always incline toward the masters [Herrschaft]
anyway, to maintain the necessery respect owed [the masters].62

While legal equals, the “necessary respect” owed to “masters” by
their servants needed to be vouchsafed. Of course the whole notion of
legal equality became weakened and hierarchical legal relations
reinforced when law tried to assure one status group the respect of
another, but not vice versa. In any case, rather than having the intended
moderating effect, § 77 was construed as another basis for right to
discipline. Article 95 of the Introductory Act to the BGB did not
directly address this indirect right, so § 77, though controversial,
remained in force until the beginning of the Weimar Republic when all
laws of domestics were repealed. Progressive politicians, especially
Social Democrats, believed indirect right to discipline to have ended
with the promulgation of the BGB and its Article 95. Others, including
the Prussian interior ministry, believed the opposite. Using convoluted
reasoning, the courts agreed with the latter:
Courts have regularly decided that § 77 of the Prussian Law of
Domestics, like comparable provisions from other [states’] laws of
domestics, cannot be abrogated by the Introductory Law to the BGB.
The aforementioned clause does not recognize the right to discipline
and, therefore, such a [right] cannot be set aside.63

Article 95’s purpose, or at least effect, became particularly clear
here: the law of domestics and the perquisites it accorded to “masters”
were to be protected even if it meant a narrow construction of servants’
putatively equal civil and criminal status. The effect of such a ruling
would be to again delay servants’ assumption of full equality under the
law of the Rechtsstaat.
62. VORMBAUM, supra note 56, at 90.
63. Id. at 356-57.
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What is especially relevant to the colonial situation is the way in
which § 77, and other aspects of the law of domestics, doubly bound
criminal law with civil station. “Masters’” civil standing offered them
freedom from prosecution for certain crimes, while servants assumed a
lesser status as victim with regard to those same crimes. It appears to
have been a short step between the negative freedom from prosecution
and the positive right to discipline. Other aspects of the law of
domestics shared this quality of modifying status under criminal law.
The most relevant to colonial history being the restrictions on servants’
right to self-defense [Notwehr]. The law of domestics forbade servants
from “actively resisting” attack except when “the life and health of the
servant is placed in present and unavoidable danger.”64 This regulation
reduced servants’ capacity for legitimate self-defense provided under the
StGB, which allowed self-defense against any “unlawful attack” without
regard to its (potential) consequences. The seemingly redundant
qualification that the threat of injury had to be “present and
unavoidable” to justify resistance compounded the law’s prejudice
against servants. Taken with § 77, the restrictions on Notwehr meant
that “masters” could exercise discipline without fear of prosecution or
retaliation. In fact, since they could not argue that they were acting in
self-defense, servants who attempted to ward off their employers’ blows
might now themselves be charged with criminal assault. As understood
and applied in the colony, these legal precepts represented more than a
simple bias in law. Rather, they accorded with perceptions of relative
social status: employers in the colony seemed to consider it a genuine
affront that they could be tried under criminal law for assault against
Africans.
IV. THE COLONIAL DEBATE OVER THE RIGHT TO DISCIPLINE
The law of domestics clearly provided the background for the
colonial practice of paternal discipline. Although, to my knowledge,
colonial jurists never grounded this practice in Prussian or any other
state’s Gesindeordnungen, the Colonial Office explicitly recognized this
source. In 1907, a confidential report written by Bernhard Dernburg,
Colonial Secretary, alluded to the pedigree of colonial employers’ right
to discipline. Commenting on the habit of “every white” in Dar-esSalam (in German East Africa) to “walk around with a whip,” Dernburg
stated, “the legal basis for this is found in the right to discipline servants,

64. § 79 Allgemeines Landrecht für die preuβischen Staaten [A.L.R.] II 5 (Prussia).
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according to which every employer is supposedly entitled to moderately
discipline his servants.”65 Not only were his doubts about a colonial
right to discipline warranted, Dernburg recognized that the BGB had
invalidated all right to discipline permitted under the law of domestics.
Later (1909) instructions from the Colonial Office to the East African
governor attempted to grapple with this problem. At issue was “if
settlers [Pflanzern] have a right, based in custom, to discipline their
colored workers as was earlier recognized by the German [heimischen]
law of domestics.” Article 95 of the Introduction to the BGB would not
counter this right because “according to § 4 of the Colonial Law it has
no application to the legal relations between natives and non-natives.”66
According to § 4, “natives are covered by the jurisdiction fixed by § 2
and the regulations indicated in § 3 only if determined by an Imperial
order.”67 This clause made the laws governing the rest of the colonies’
inhabitants, namely those outlined in §§ 2 and 3, inapplicable to natives,
excepting special cases defined by Imperial Order. Section 4 presented
African legal standing negatively, excluding them from legal equality
with German settlers without presenting an alternative legal status for
them under German law. The Colonial Office’s opinion used § 4 to
translate native’s lack of any clear legal status into a carte blanche to
define that status on an ad hoc basis. In this case, § 4 functioned to deny
natives the protections potentially offered by the BGB. At the same
time, it remained unclear why German law of domestics applied to
natives if the Civil Code did not. Perhaps this problem kept colonial
jurists from explicitly grounding colonial right to discipline in specific
provisions of the law of domestics.
The relation of African labor to white employers, especially on
farms but also in mining concerns, did in fact markedly resemble the
master-servant relations that faded in Germany over the course of the
nineteenth century. Restrictions on the freedom to enter into contracts
and the mobility of labor, ordinances against “vagabondage,” and the
quasi-police powers of settlers vis à vis natives all recalled an earlier
ständisch [ordered by status] society in Germany. African farm workers
seemed to be genuinely part of their employers’ “household,” although
in the colony a system of debt peonage often replaced any sense of
paternal obligation. In other words, colonial law was out of phase with
colonial society. Whereas the notion of Rechtsstaat and law, especially
65. FRITZ FERDINAND MÜLLER, KOLONIEN UNTER DER PEITSCHE: EINE DOKUMENTATION 75
(1962).
66. Id. at 79-80.
67. HÖPFNER, supra note 51, at 53-54.
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criminal law, blind to status suffused the legal system and most of the
laws brought to the colony by Germany, a rigid status system—indicated
by the Colonial Office’s references to master-servant relationships—
rather than a civil society of equals or potential equals organized
colonial society. The issue of right to discipline became salient in the
colony, then, because it required the reconciliation of modern law with
relationships of status.
This attempt to differentiate the legal disposition of status in the
colony from that in Germany creates an immediate problem.
Contemporary German law could hardly be said to have ignored status,
despite the trend just described. Women and children, socialists and
Catholics all faced legal discrimination.68 Or even more to the point,
servants continued to be recognized in German law as occupying a
unique, albeit increasingly untenable, legal position. Natives’ treatment
under German law, then, might appear to be simply an extension of its
treatment of other so-called minorities. How was the status position of
natives in the colony different from that of groups subject to legal and
social discrimination in Germany?
Several distinctions must be made here. First of all, Imperial
Germany’s outgroups hardly held parallel positions in society or even in
law. Many contemporaries viewed legal discrimination against servants
or Catholics as anachronistic. They felt it contradicted the spirit and
perhaps the letter of the law in the Rechtsstaat [state under the rule of
law].69 The legal status of women, by contrast, seemed more natural.
As one recent scholar of Wilhelminian civil law points out, anti-Catholic
and anti-socialist laws were considered exceptional, that is, as prima
facie deviations from the normal rule of law.70 Legal discrimination
against women and children, in contrast, did not appear exceptional to
the mainstream, but rather in accord with the essential nature of these
groups. Also grounded in their putative (racial) nature, the legal position
of natives in this respect more closely resembled that of women than
servants in Germany.
Claims that colonial corporal discipline furthered natives’ education
[Erziehung] closely tied the issue to the status of children in the
metropole. As we saw above, legal discussions of discipline in Imperial
Germany usually concerned its use in education. In the colonies too,
natives were frequently compared to children, and justifications of
68. See, e.g., DAVID BLACKBOURN & GEOFF ELEY, THE PECULIARITIES OF GERMAN
HISTORY 243 (1984).
69. JOHN, supra note 60, at 2.
70. Id.
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corporal discipline often invoked its pedagogical usefulness. As
Ferdinand Müller notes, the term “paternal” discipline is more than an
incidentally hypocritical euphemism.
It perfectly suits colonial
“theory’s image of the African as a dependent child,” who must be
placed under the dominion of white “fathers,” in order to be well
brought-up.71
However, the justification of right to discipline by reference to
education did not translate well into the colonial situation for two
reasons, one having to do with local political issues and the other with
the nature of colonial racial ideology. The political issue concerned the
position of religious missions in colonial society. Most missionaries
advocated the spiritual education of natives, a position which implied a
measure of equality between whites and natives. As a result, colonial
missions were viewed as soft on the “native question,” and the
promotion of education for natives became associated with the widely
disparaged “humanistic” approach to “native policy.”72 Therefore the
legitimation of corporal discipline as a pedagogical tool fit uneasily with
other aspects of colonial policy. Presenting discipline as educative was
also out of step with contemporary, pseudo-Darwinian racial ideology,
central to which was the belief that natives as a group lagged behind
whites developmentally. In this respect, the comparisons of natives to
children alluded to the belief that “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny”;
that is, they were like children, but they were stuck there, that is, not
individually educable.73 This ideology deferred treatment of natives as
equals until the distant future, when they as a whole would have attained
a cultural level commensurate with whites. Discipline’s representation
as a means to education, for these reasons, turned out to be little more
than a way to justify corporal discipline in terms of labor relations.
Natives were seen as naturally lazy, and “education” became acclimation
to work; it was as laborer that the native assumed the social position
appropriate to his cultural development according to colonial ideology.74
71. MÜLLER, supra note 65, at 65 (emphasis in original).
72. To paint a critic a “humanist” was a common strategy of colonialists. Not only socialists
who opposed the colonial project entirely, but any advocate of colonial reform were labelled thus.
According to colonial hardliners, “humanists” were those who derived colonial policy from beliefs
in a universal human nature—belief in educability, for example—and a minimal set of natural rights
for all stemming therefrom. In contrast, hardliners took the position that only first-hand experience
with natives could produce an appropriate “native policy,” which consequently assumed a much
harsher, “realistic,” means-ends form. Of course the first-hand knowledge invoked by hardliners
was no less an ideological construct than the “humanistic” view—what “experience” gave was a
knowledge of the fundamental inequality of “natives.”
73. For an example of this view, see infra note 87 and accompanying text.
74. Id.
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In terms of political culture, discrimination against natives was
closer to the treatment of “reichsfeindlich” groups like socialists.75 In
these terms, the treatment of natives under law markedly contrasted with
that of women and children, or of servants for that matter. The latter
groups played undeniably crucial roles in social reproduction. Natives,
even more so than other “enemies of the Reich,” were seen as apart from
rather than a part of German society, and at times even as socially
expendable.76 Legal discrimination against natives in the colonies
represented, then, an amalgam of the types of discrimination present in
contemporary German law. Their socio-economic position most nearly
paralleled that of servants, but this position was not seen as an archaic
remnant of a fading social structure. Colonial law, in this regard, served
to organize and discipline native labor for the benefit of German
economic interests. The legal position of natives was nearest to that of
women or children because rather than exceptional, it was based in a
perceived essential nature. Here, colonial law placed natives in a
permanent position of racially grounded legal subordination. Finally,
politically, the relevant comparison is to so-called “enemies of the
Reich,” who were subject to exceptional laws. Colonial law and native
policy associated with this third position, in part, functioned to secure
white colonial society against the real or perceived threat of native
violence.
This combination of legal bases for discrimination involved more
than a simple application of existing German laws, like the law of
domestics, to the colonies. Although the control of labor remained a
central interest of right to discipline in the colony as it had under the law
of domestics, colonial law arguably also represented a new departure.
Just as turn-of-the century populist movements in the Reich transformed
politics by mobilizing nationalist and racialist ideas,77 a less noticeable
legal transformation, employing the same tools, was underway in the
colonies. Whether or not this legal culture influenced later unions of
race and law, colonial legal communities strove to reconcile modern law
with racially-based social status. The discourse surrounding the problem
75. A Reichsfeind is an enemy of the Reich (Empire); “reichsfeindlich” is the adjectival form
of this word.
76. Germany’s genocidal military policy during the Herero and Nama uprisings, of course,
provides the most obvious example of this view. This view persisted despite the total dependence
of the colonial economy on African labor.
77. See, e.g., GEOFF ELEY, RESHAPING THE GERMAN RIGHT: RADICAL NATIONALISM AND
POLITICAL CHANGE AFTER BISMARCK (1980) (discussing the evolution of the German Right);
PETER PULZER, THE RISE OF POLITICAL ANTI-SEMITISM IN GERMANY & AUSTRIA (1988)
(providing an account of the period of increased anti-semitism in the two countries).
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of right to discipline presents a microcosm of this legal transformation.
It reflected attempts to define a unique legal position for natives as
victims of criminal violence.
There were two legal realms of corporal discipline in the colony,
police discipline [Prügelstrafe] and employers’ (paternal) right to
discipline. Colonial law explicitly regulated the former, limiting the
extent and nature of the punishment, listing all who held this authority,
and laying out the protocol for carrying out and recording such
punishment. Of course, in the colony police could not discipline white
settlers but only natives. Police discipline had been made illegal in
Prussia in 1848, so members of German civil society could no longer
receive corporal punishment.78 This type of discipline matched that
formerly held by police authorities in Germany, which punished minor
delicts outside the notice of criminal law and had more to do with social
discipline than criminal punishment. It functioned as the official form of
employers’ right to discipline; employers were to bring offending
workers to the police for discipline. “In most cases corporal punishment
was imposed, in accord with its primary function, against so called labor
delicts . . . ‘laziness,’ ‘continual indolence,’ ‘negligent work,’
‘disobedience,’” and so on.79 Police discipline warrants attention
because it showed the deliberate extension to natives of a type of
corporal discipline seen as outdated in Germany. But it does not fit into
the framework of the present discussion, since it concerns administrative
rather than criminal law, that is, this type of discipline never seemed to
result in charges of criminal assault. This chapter focuses on the second
sort of discipline, that of the employer, since it was here that the
threshold between right to discipline and criminal abuse was established.
It bears repeating that the colonial right to discipline of employers
in South West Africa had no clear basis in positive law. This fact
became especially clear in an exchange between a reform-minded local
official and deputy governor Oskar Hintrager in 1912.80 The local
official, a von Roebern, strongly objected to the customary practice of
discipline, blaming it for the strained “native relations.” Apparently
suspicious of discipline’s legal basis, Roebern asked for clarification and
offered his own argument for the illegitimacy of the current practice.
Reasoning from the term “right to paternal discipline,” Roebern ventured
78. LÜDTKE, supra note 19, at 123.
79. MÜLLER, supra note 65, at 81-82.
80. Hintrager was a hard line official with a long tenure in South West Africa. OSKAR
HINTRAGER, SÜDWESTAFRIKA IN DER DEUTSCHEN ZEIT (1956) (recounting his memory of this
period).
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that the BGB paragraph (§ 1631) describing a father’s right to discipline
over his children provided the source of the colonial right to discipline.
He then caviled against this paragraph’s application in the colony. He
argued that this paternal authority could be delegated to wives or
mothers only under strictly defined circumstances (BGB § 1684), and
that it could not be granted to white supervisors or foremen at all. But in
the colony all these people regularly exercised discipline, complained
Roebern, and “if the miserable Hottentot so much as raises his arm in
defense, this is taken as ‘attempted assault’ and the native is hauled
before the judge for violently threatening a white.” Noting that the BGB
protected children against abusive fathers, Roebern asserted that the
validity of one paragraph meant the validity of the other. “[For]
practical [reasons], the loss of the paternal authority to punish ought to
be made known publicly in the official gazette [Amtsblatt].”81
In response, Hintrager denied the need for clarification of the right
to discipline. Colonial courts had ruled, he said, “that according to
common law the master [Dienstherr], his family, and [his] white
employees, under whom natives work, possess the right to mild
discipline vis-à-vis natives.”82 This right, he continued, did not stem
from BGB § 1631 as Roebern supposed, but rather merely resembled it
in many respects. The existing practice of the right to discipline did not
present a danger to natives or native relations because its transgression
constituted assault [Körperverletzung]—an act that would elicit both
criminal prosecution and administrative measures to prevent the
offending businesses from receiving more workers from government
procurers.83
A second letter from Roebern repeated his original points and
objected to Hintrager’s complacency. Colonial courts did not provide
enough protection, and administrative restrictions on workers were
easily circumvented. According to Roebern’s estimation as police
officer, native commissioner and head of administration, “[e]very
conflict with natives leads to excessive paternal discipline. . . . If the
colony is again guided to a shipwreck in the native question, then we
will have the paternal right to discipline to thank.”84

81. Strafbefugnisse weißer Dienstherrn gegen ihre farbigen Angestellten, Generalia
[Authority of white supervisors to punish their colored laborers], ZENTRALBUREAU DES
KAISERLICHEN GOUVERNEMENTS [ZBU] 717, FV q.1, 3r-3v (on file with National Archives of
Namibia).
82. Id. at 2r-2v (emphasis in original).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 3r-3v.
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Ignoring Roebern’s concerns, another deputy governor named
Kornmayer responded that the colony had not yet reached a position in
which it could set aside the right to discipline; in the absence of
extensive police authority, farmers could not manage without this right.85
Roebern’s concerns found a more receptive ear with yet a third official,
native Commissioner Streitwolf.
Streitwolf agreed that colonial
disciplinary practices could lead to a “shipwreck.” Lacking any
statutory grounding, he reasoned, the right to discipline was “therefore
clearly illegal [direkt ungesetzlich].” This illegal situation, perpetuated
by colonial courts, ought to be abolished by explicit order.86
I have described this exchange in some detail because it introduces
many of the issues relating to colonial right to discipline. The first thing
that ought to be said about the right to discipline, namely, that it was
“clearly illegal,” came almost last in this exchange. No statute granted
employers the right to discipline their workers physically. In fact, the
explicit delegation of this authority to police officials might seem to
contradict settlers’ claims to possess this right. However, as Hintrager
asserted, the colonial courts recognized discipline as a “customary right”
adhering to any white in a position of authority over a native. In a
decision from 1911 sometimes cited as having established the right to
discipline, the colonial upper court reasoned thus:
White employers [Dienstherr] in the colony cannot entirely be denied
a right to mild [gelindes] discipline separate from official criminal
authority. The upper court has heretofore always held this view and it
has no occasion to deviate from it. The white employer has not only
the bodily needs of his natives to care for, but, if he takes seriously his
task as conveyor of heimischer culture and morality [Gesittung] to the
natives, also works toward their development into orderly and useful
people. Among other things, this development involves that they
become accustomed to structured labor, feelings of obligation, and
obedience. The character of the native, however, does not always
allow him to attain these [goals] without a certain amount of coercion,
and therefore, a mild right to discipline cannot be completely
dispensed with. Because in respect to morals and intellect [Geist] on
the average natives are no more highly developed than a child in need
of education at home. For each offense, for each case of disobedience
or insubordination, the employer cannot easily go to the official
criminal authority . . . Here he must have the authority, if remonstrance
and admonition do not suffice, to apply discipline, as an energetic

85. Id. at 3v.
86. Id. at 4r.
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means of education. A strong box on the ears or a fitting blow with a
crop to the back or the bottom often works better than all talk.87

The definition of this right as “gelindes” staked out a moderate
administrative position in this debate. Defenders of the right to
discipline would typically describe the act of discipline as “a few boxes
on the ears,” a description which cast critics’ concerns as exaggerated.
But while the debate about the right to discipline often focused on such
“mild” forms of discipline, the cases reaching the courts made clear that
in actual custom discipline was usually administered with a sjambok,
stick, or the like. In the case just quoted, for example, the victim was
tied between the front and back wheels of a wagon and beaten on the
back with an Ox whip.
The various participants in abusive acts also spoke very little of
discipline as an educative tool. More often, defendants justified
excessive discipline as a response to disobedience or crimes allegedly
committed by the victim or natives in general. These crimes then
provided the context in which to understand a violent act far exceeding
the limits of discipline set by the court. In other words, abusive settlers
became angry and mistreated Africans rather than consciously applying
discipline in the service of education. Settlers seemed to beat Africans
as a means of “frontier justice.” Colonial courts firmly rejected the view
that settlers had the general authority to take criminal justice into their
own hands, insisting instead that discipline was a pedagogical tool. In
doing so, the courts ignored discipline as it was actually practiced in the
colony while at the same time providing it with a legitimating argument.
There was a gap between the reality of discipline and its definition
by newspapers, administrators, and courts. This fact meant that Roebern
and Hintrager were talking at cross purposes. Roebern expressed the
potential danger in the actual practice of discipline, while Hintrager
dismissed his anxiety by reference to the presumptive practice. The
latter’s reassurance that colonial courts acted as an effective sanction
against transgressions of the right to discipline extended this reasoning
according to an ideal practice. One ought to be skeptical of such a
claim, not necessarily because of bad faith on the part of colonial judges,
but rather because it assumed that the courts served as an adequate
counter to excessive discipline. Given the limits to administrative
authority in the colony and the difficulty Africans had in making
complaints against whites, the threat of penalty for going beyond “a few
87. Kaiserliches Bezirksgericht Keetmanshoop [Imperial District Court Keetmanshoop]
[GKE], Akte 295, D 4a/10, 82r (on file with the National Archives of Namibia).
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boxes on the ears” must have seemed very slight. Hintrager was being
disingenuous; he knew of the colonial realities intimated by Roebern. It
is not so clear, however, why he maintained this willful ignorance.
In fact, the central colonial administration had strongly expressed
its concern about the mistreatment of natives under the guise of corporal
discipline on at least two separate occasions prior to the current
exchange. In 1908, colonial governor Schuckmann noted “various
recent cases in which settlers” had severely mistreated “their natives”
and asked local officials to report on such cases in their districts.
Schuckmann viewed the issue as a labor problem and the lack of
adequate legal protection for natives as a danger to efficient organization
of the colonial work force.
If the native first had been convinced that he not only would be
regarded as a man, but also that his justified complaints [berechtigte
Aussprache] would be taken into account and that he was protected by
the law, then he would not have as much inclination to run away from
his employers [Dienstherrn].88

While narrowly defining the problem as one of labor,
Schuckmann’s association of legal protection with being “viewed as a
man” implicitly broached the broadest problem of law’s social meaning.
In a letter to the Colonial Office, Schuckmann described the issue in
more general legal terms:
[I]t has proved to be a great disadvantage, that the native’s respect for
our administration of justice [Rechtspflege] has doubtlessly been
severely harmed. Because of the great distance to our courts and their
excessive workload [Überlastung], grave abuses of natives that have
taken place on remote farms do not first reach the courts until the
native has gotten the feeling that the perpetrator will be released
[ausgehen] unpunished.89

Here, the problem became less one of labor than of native respect
for the German legal system. This system’s failure to punish white
abusers of natives represented not only a threat to labor relations, but
also a blow to the integrity of German law itself.
In 1912, current Governor Seitz expressed even stronger concern
about the legal disposition of discipline/abuse cases. In a secret circular
to local officials, Seitz lamented the “despairing mood” among natives
88. Mißhandlung von Eingeborenen durch Weiße, Generalia [Abuse of natives by whites],
ZENTRAL BUREAU DES KAISERLICHEN GOUVERNEMENTS [ZBU] 2054, W III r.1, Bd.1, 1r-2r (on file
with the National Archives of Namibia).
89. Id. at 3r-3v.
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arising from the failure of courts to punish “brutal outrages [rohe
Ausschreitungen]” of whites against them. Seitz viewed this situation as
a severe danger to the German presence in the colony itself:
Natives, who doubt the impartiality of our judicial decisions, would be
driven thereby to a blind hate of everything that is white and ultimately
to self-defence, i.e., revolt. It is obvious that these feelings of hatred
among the natives, if not energetically redressed, must lead sooner or
later to a renewed, desperate, native uprising and consequently the
colony’s [Land] economic ruin. It is also in the interest of the entire
white population that elements who rage against the natives with
senseless ferocity and consider their white skin as a license to commit
brutal crimes be neutralized in every way. A people that makes a
claim to be considered a ruling people [Herrenvolk] must above all
else keep its own house in order. If the crimes of whites against
natives occasion no or inadequate penalty, it is impossible in the long
run to respond to the crimes of natives against whites with the severity
required by the general interest.90

Seitz’s memo addressed the three primary justifications of corporal
discipline—labor, security, and race—and used each of them to advocate
stronger prosecution of abuse cases. Continued injustice would produce
hatred and violence causing “the economic ruin” of the colony.
Mistreatment of natives belied German claims to the title of Herrenvolk.
Whether from conviction or for rhetorical reasons, Seitz’s jeremiad
invoked only German interests rather than, for example, concern for
native welfare. In other words, in the contemporary context the same
ideology used to legitimate white discipline of natives was also deployed
in arguments against abuse.
Seitz’s memo also located itself at the intersection of race, violence,
and the law. At the same time that he implicitly congratulated German
law for its impartiality, he also associated it with all things white. For
Seitz, not only the principles of justice but also the obligations of the
master race demanded punishment of settlers who mistreated natives.
By claiming that native crimes against whites could only be adequately
punished if white crimes against native were too, Seitz was advocating
legal reciprocity rather than legal equality for natives. This sentiment
reflected the noblesse oblige a master owed his household in a society
structured according to status, but in German South West Africa race
determined status.
Seitz’s invocation of the colonial economy spoke to those who felt
90. Id. at 7r-7v.
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that the native had to be acclimated to work through physical discipline
or at least justified abuse in this way. Settlers with a more global
interest in the colonial “common good,” defined in economic terms,
would probably have included established farmers and traders and the
larger businesses, such as mining. Seitz’s memo would have appealed to
their sense of social superiority not only to natives but also to the less
wealthy or prominent white settlers whom they employed. By citing
“those elements of the white population, who rage against natives with
senseless brutality,” Seitz strengthened his case vis-á-vis those who
defined themselves against such elements. Such elements, finally,
would have come from among settler-laborers who often worked as
foremen over native workers. For them, the discipline of natives likely
expressed their ressentiment against their social “betters” as much as it
did their sense of racial superiority over natives.91
As a deputy governor, Hintrager must have been aware of these
memos and the concerns behind them, and yet continued to frustrate
Roebern’s attempt to deal with the issue. The murkiness of Hintrager’s
motivations may have arisen out of the mixed legal and cultural basis of
colonial right to discipline with which this section began. Colonial right
to discipline’s most obvious purpose was to discipline labor. Writing on
this issue, colonial historian Fritz Müller argued that the inability of
German colonizers to deprive natives of the means of subsistence
entirely—through war, confiscation, and so on—necessitated the use of
extra-economic coercion to create a work force useful to German
economic interests. The various violent means used to compel labor,
Müller argued, carried over into the workplace itself. “In order to break
the resistance of the oppressed worker against a truly murderous
exploitation, almost all of the employers in the German colonies reach
for the lash.”92 However, this argument falters precisely in this last step.
While the various forms of impressment served colonizers’ economic
interests, violence toward Africans in the workplace—sometimes so
severe that the worker could no longer work—did not. As Schuckmann
and Seitz among others argued, excessive violence undermined the
colonizer’s ability to fashion and maintain a productive native labor
force. It was, in fact, the prescribed extent of discipline—a few boxes
on the ears—that was widely seen as best suited to the colony’s
economic ends. Hintrager’s stance, in other words, did not accord with
91. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS Essays I & II (Walter
Kaufmann ed. & R. J. Hollingdale trans., Random House, 1967) (discussing the concept of
ressentiment).
92. MÜLLER, supra note 65, at 33.
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the most apparent and perhaps primary function of colonial right to
discipline: labor discipline. He turned a blind eye to the negative
effects—to German interests—of the actual practice of corporal
punishment.
The reason for Hintrager’s position and discipline’s other
“purposes” prove harder to determine because they may not have been
economically instrumental. Kornmayer’s brief interpolation in the
exchange hints at another possible purpose behind the refusal to perceive
the practice of discipline as other than the ideal. He viewed the right to
discipline as an alternative to extensive police authority and a safeguard
to white security, rather than as a way to control labor. This sort of
thinking suffused debates about the right to discipline, but the logic
behind it was not clearly articulated. Whether or nor they were correct,
settlers, especially in outlying areas, often saw themselves as threatened
by “natives,” including those whom they employed. Stories of native
workers poisoning settlers occasionally appeared in colonial newspapers,
but they were invariably unsubstantiated and often turned out to be
untrue. In the prominent trial of Elisabeth Ohlsen, a “farmer’s wife,” for
manslaughter [Totschlag], white witnesses repeatedly alleged a
conspiracy to poison the Ohlsen’s and their livestock.93 Such assertions
did not clearly fit in with the logic of the defense’s argument because it
claimed that Ohlsen had not struck the decisive blows, and her exercise
of the right to discipline never exceeded a slap or a box on the ears.
Further, no one claimed that killing of the victim, Deubib, came in
response to the poisonings. Still the tenor of the argument was that an
amorphous threat from natives justified an excessive beating, in this case
to death. The court accepted this argument and acquitted Ohlsen. The
juxtaposition of poisoning, discipline, and violent assault implied that
Ohlsen had attacked Deubib in self-defense, although clearly something
else was going on in this case.
A contemporary article about the Ohlsen case shared this confusion
about the discipline/abuse issue. The article, “Lessons of the Ohlsen
Trial,” perfunctorily denied Ohlsen’s guilt but devoted much more
energy to expressions of outrage over the fact of the trial itself. In its
view the problem with discipline was not the tendency for it to become
abuse, but that this abuse could be prosecuted in colonial courts. Since
such cases invariably required assessing the relative merits of white and

93. Farmerfrau Elisabeth Ohlsen wegen Totschlags [Trial of farmer’s wife Elizabeth Ohlsen
for manslaughter], Gericht Windhoek [Windhoek Court] 728, 3K9/11 (on file with the National
Archives of Namibia).
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native testimony, the article complained about the assumption of “legal
equality [Gleichgerechtigkeit]” between the races in colonial law.
Arising from the State’s Attorney’s Office’s exaggerated desire to keep
natives from feeling “rightless,” such legal equality insulted white
honor more than it endangered settlers:
Inasmuch as one is willing to take the feelings of the natives into
consideration, then surely no white, e.g., who knocks down a native in
self-defense ought to go unpunished! We would think that the feeling
of rightlessness among the natives would not be lessened but perhaps
increased if they believed themselves to have full legal equality with
whites. If natives are allowed to think that they are legally equal to
whites, then it is all over with the preservation of the distance between
white and black that is the precondition for a useful employment
[Verwendung] of natives.94

Here we have Seitz’s reasoning in reverse; legal protection for
natives ran counter to colonial interests. Of course the concerns about
native legal equality with settlers were hyperbolic given the explicit
exclusion of natives from the jurisdiction of regular German law, but
they still gleaned an element of truth. For, if settlers were to be held
responsible for crimes against natives, then criminal law did provide the
latter with a measure of protection qualitatively the same as it provided
for the former. Although the passage includes reference both to security
and economic issues—self-defense and “useful employment of
natives”—its deeper concern seemed to be the maintenance of a certain
relative racial status. Like Hintrager, the article denied the actual
practice of discipline while espousing administrative practices that
would allow it to continue unhindered.
Arguments about security, in fact, seem more like ideological
justifications of the practice of discipline than accurate descriptions of
colonial reality, which is not to say settlers did not sincerely believe
themselves in peril. For instance, rather than feeling immediately
threatened by Deubib, Ohlsen most likely went too far in administering
“discipline,” and it was courtroom exigencies that elicited the link with
the alleged poisoning conspiracy. In this case, again, we are left
wondering why the practice of discipline differed from the stated norm,
and why the court, in turn, cooperated in the restatement of the illusory
ideal as reality. The practice of discipline may have stemmed as much
from beliefs about the status and nature of natives as from rational
94. Lehren des Ohlsen-Prozeßes [Lessons of the Ohlsen Case], SÜD-WESTBÖTE, December
23, 1911 (emphasis in the German original).
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impulses to control labor or secure life and property. This possibility
makes the most sense of Hintrager’s position, which now can be seen as
mediating between the ideal protection of natives under modern criminal
law and their actual social and cultural position as essentially inferior.
The material issue of physical discipline or abuse was subordinated to a
discursive cycle of legal argument and evasiveness that deferred the
problem’s resolution. This discourse described discipline that deviated
from the norm as something else, on the one hand, as self-defense in
Ohlsen’s case or, on the other, abuse. Neither alternative addressed the
difficulties of grounding the real practice of discipline in modern law.
Rather than seeking a new basis for a sort of discipline that contradicted
current German law, Hintrager and others could simply deny its nature.
By doing so, settlers could continue to employ physical abuse to express
and maintain their “superior” racial status.
Corporal discipline, then, was many things. It can first be defined
as the actions that accompanied the intent to discipline, actions that
generally ranged from a few boxes on the ears to a beating with a
sjambok. Specific instances of such discipline largely remained beyond
the notice of colonial officials, courts, and publicists; it stemmed from
the right possessed by white “masters” according to a custom derived
from racialist “truisms” rather than tradition. The courts sanctioned this
violence by calling it “mild discipline.” Only in the very general
ways—like in Schuckmann or Seitz’s memos—was this discipline cast
as violence. Next, corporal discipline constituted a trope in a legal
strategy on two levels. In specific cases, the placement of an abusive act
on a continuum of discipline altered and mitigated the nature of the
crime. As we see in the Ohlsen case, the story of Deubib’s death turned
on issues like discipline or self-defense, which provided the best
possible construction of Ohlsen’s intentions. As a more general legal
strategy, the figure of corporal discipline legitimated a certain level of
white violence against natives by placing it outside of the concern of
criminal law. The exclusion of disciplinary acts from criminal
prosecution meant that the minimal level of violence against Africans
visible to the colonial judicial system was greater, that is more violent,
than the minimal level of violence against whites. Corporal discipline
provided a means to control labor and a way to reinforce relative racial
status. Alternatively, it might be spoken of as a safeguard to settler
security or as a tool for the cultural education of “natives.” These
different meanings of corporal discipline each informed the right to
discipline debate in varying degrees.
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V. DISCIPLINE IN THE MINES
The labor issue constituted the most immediate, and perhaps
determining, context for the right to discipline debate as a whole. It was
toward the end of the German colonial period, when diamonds were
finally discovered and mining became an important enterprise, that the
issue of the right to discipline first came into prominence. The
widespread use of corporal punishment on farms was carried over into
the mines. A number of differences between mine and farm labor most
likely now forced the issue of discipline into the forefront. First of all,
the labor forces differed in the two types of undertaking. Farmers
tended to employ local Africans, who lived permanently in the vicinity
and were expected to renew their contracts indefinitely. The mines, in
contrast, employed chiefly migrant workers, who returned home upon
the expiration of their relatively brief contracts. The greater mobility
and turnover of miners brought the issue of discipline/abuse into greater
relief. More people became aware of the practice of discipline, they
traveled throughout the colony with this knowledge, and stories of abuse
became an impediment to the recruitment of new contract workers. A
second difference in the circumstances of farm laborers and miners lay
in the location of their work. Mining took place in the relatively large
population concentrations created by the mines themselves, whereas
farms were remotely located. This fact made discipline/abuse more
visible in mines, and the existence of a proximate police authority
around them allowed acts of abuse to be prosecuted more easily. Also
with the mines and the resulting intensive labor practices, the colonial
government created the post of “Native Commissioner,” a local official
among whose tasks was the representation of natives in legal matters.
Exchanges between mining interests, local officials, and central
administrators laid out the issues and positions concerning the right to
discipline most clearly and in the greatest detail. Although specific
instances of discipline/abuse provided the context for these exchanges,
they dealt mostly in generalities and thus illustrate the strains between
the central administration’s interest in preventing abuse, local
administrators’ concern with protecting their own positions, and mining
concerns’ desire for free rein in conducting their business. The
particular abuse cases, in turn, supply an indispensable template for
understanding these exchanges—only through them we can understand
how the abstractions of this relatively rarefied exchange translated into
colonial labor practices. These exchanges and cases not only allow a
glimpse into colonial reality, but also offer a window onto the interplay
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between sociocultural practice and law. The exchange described below
shared a familiar quality with other conflicts over “native policy.” The
various participants all claimed to agree on the basic issue, so the dispute
seems to be about details, the best way to achieve a common goal. But
when the superficial agreement to limit abuse is examined more closely,
one finds that it conceals widely divergent positions. This fact becomes
especially clear when the rhetoric is placed next to labor and judicial
practices.
All parties in the discussion of discipline in the mines shared an
ostensible concern with South West Africa’s economic well-being. This
fact ought to allow one to understand the issue in terms of conflicting
economic interests, but this does not prove to be the case. Rather, as
with discipline on farms, discipline in the mines cannot be understood
simply in terms of economic instrumentality. The various participants in
the exchanges concerning such discipline had differing motivations.
Certain local and central administrators came closest to sincerely
wishing to provide physical security to natives. They justified this aim
by pointing to its beneficial effect on the colonial economy. However,
such arguments may have displaced humanitarian or paternalist ones,
which had become untenable in the colony after the uprisings. Other
officials, again both local and central, while also invoking the danger to
the economic good posed by the abuse of natives, showed themselves to
be in fact resistant to any government interventions that strove to
minimize instances of abuse. The central administrators who fell into
this category claimed to be helpless before the letter of the law.95 It may
be that these high-ranking officials, like Deputy Governor Oskar
Hintrager, who in contrast to the governor served for long periods of
time, resented the intervention of those officials, including the governor,
more politically motivated and more closely associated with the Colonial
Office in Berlin. Resistant local officials may have felt similarly about
interference from Windhoek into matters close at hand, which they felt
they knew best. Business interests, who also lamented the abuse of
natives, sought to portray the discipline/abuse problem as a private
matter between employer and employee.
Left out of these discussions, except for their participation in court
cases, were the abusers themselves and their victims. The former hardly
seemed interested in the economic efficacy of their violent acts. Mine
foremen, rather, used abuse to position themselves socially. Their
95. On “helplessness” as a means to legitimate unjust uses of law, see ROSS, supra note 3,
ch.3.
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willingness and ability to act violently toward natives without
repercussion expressed their sense of racial superiority to natives.
Racial domination compensated for their otherwise weak social position
among whites. The courts viewed such violence as a natural response to
the colonial situation and cooperated in establishing an exculpatory
context for it, often by invoking racial difference in their rulings in abuse
cases.
In 1911 a local official in Lüderitz, the center of the diamond
mining industry, wrote to the local mining chamber, a private
organization, to complain about the frequent employment of previously
abusive whites as foremen over natives. Citing the mines’ own interests,
the official, Assessor Heiligbrunner, requested that such whites be fired
or moved to jobs without oversight of “natives.” The Imperial Mining
Office, the Native Commissioner, and he agreed, Heiligbrunner
concluded, to use “police orders” to assure that “unsuitable people are
not used in such positions (e.g., as foremen or sortierer) in which they
have direct oversight over natives.”96 The chairmen of the mining
chamber professed ready agreement with Heiligbrunner’s central point:
whites who had mistreated natives should not occupy supervisory
positions. But, they hastened to add, labor discipline had been
“noticeably” deteriorating and “cases of disobedience and brazen
impudence on the part of natives are becoming ever more numerous.”
The chairmen attributed this state of affairs to recent efforts of the native
Commissioner, who, through his solicitation of complaints, “appears to
have given rise to the opinion among the natives that the white
supervisors cannot tell them what to do, and whether or not any work
gets done simply depends on their good will.”97 The chairmen reserved
their strongest objections for Heiligbrunner’s claim of police authority in
the matter, calling it “a serious encroachment on private rights.”98 They
would “gladly” voluntarily follow the practice Heiligbrunner suggested,
but the members of the mining chamber would not allow administrators
to determine whom they hired and fired. “Criminal law alone suffices to
render harmless people who groundlessly mistreat natives. Everything
else must be left to the discretion of the employer, who can judge best if
an employee is more useful or harmful to their business.”99
On the surface, this conflict seems only to have concerned a
96. Mißhandlung von Eingeborenen durch Weiße, Specialia, ZBU 2054, WIIr2, Bd.1, 66 (on
file with the National Archives of Namibia).
97. Id. at 67.
98. Id. at 68.
99. Id. at 68.
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somewhat abstract question of legal principle, namely, the limits posed
to police power by private rights. As for the substantive problem, local
officials and mining interests appear to have agreed completely that
abusive whites should be fired or transferred to another job. However,
the chairmen’s digression about “disobedience and insolence” among
native workers points to another reading and belies their claim that
criminal law adequately protected natives from mistreatment. On the
one hand, they criticized the native Commissioner’s pursuit of native
complaints against abusive whites as undermining employers’ authority,
while on the other, they invoked the very same practice as a sufficient
safeguard of “natives.” Beneath the mining chamber’s ostensible shared
concern for native life lay a strenuous call for a laissez-faire policy on
the part of the colonial government. Ideally, the chamber chairmen
seemed to imply, not only would civil law prevent state interference into
employment policies, but also administrators of criminal law would not
look too deeply at criminal abuses in the mines.
A year later the mining chamber made this position more explicit.
Responding to renewed complaints by Lüderitz Native Commissioner
Tönjes about labor practices, the chamber reaffirmed and even hardened
its previous position by dismissing the criticism of the police and courts.
In a letter written on June 18, the chairmen again acknowledged the
danger presented to the general good by abusive mine foremen, but now
implied that alleged incidents of abuse were more a product of
overzealous colonial officials than unsound labor conditions. The
chamber’s letter began, “the assertion of the Native Commissioner that
numerous instances of abuse occurred upon the establishment of the
Colonial Mining Association is not true.” In fact, the chairmen
maintained, there was less abuse than one would expect in an operation
with 1,200 employees, “a large proportion of which are insolent and
unwilling to work.” If Tönjes “was not led by impractical, excessive
idealism,” he would realize the soundness of the company’s labor
practices, particularly given “natives’ characteristic inclination toward
laziness.” The chairmen cited the mines’ practice of black-listing white
employees deemed “unsuitable” for working in the mines, one criterion
of suitability being “groundless mistreatment of natives” (emphasis
mine). However, the letter continued, it would be unjust to fire and
blacklist an employee for a single abusive act. Rather, “if in other
respects [such employees] possess a good character and are proficient at
their jobs,” the mine ought simply “to warn them against further
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excesses.”100
The mining chamber’s letter ceded little to local officials’ concerns.
It implied that instances of abuse in the mines were a reasonable
response to the intractability of native workers. The chairmen’s use of
the word “groundless” indicated that the mines, not the courts or local
administration, ought to bear responsibility for determining when abuse
had occurred. The previous year the mining chamber claimed merely to
be guarding mines’ legal prerogatives under civil law, while avowing
commitment to the spirit of administrators’ suggestion that foremen
found guilty of criminal assault be transferred or fired. Now the
chairmen not only would reserve punishment for repeat offenders, but
also would replace the criminal code’s construction of abuse with their
own. A report by the Colonial Mining Association [Koloniale Bergbau
Gesellschaft) to the mining chamber attached to the latter’s letter
confirms this impression. This report explains away instances of abuse
confirmed in colonial courts, even going so far as to express regret for
dismissing the only employee it did fire, an employee twice tried and
once convicted for mistreating Ovambo workers. Citing the “great
deceitfulness of the Ovambo”, the report derogated another guilty
verdict by crediting the defendant’s professions of innocence over the
conflicting claims of the Ovambo witnesses. Generally, the report
rejected the manner in which colonial courts weighed testimony, stating
“that the testimony of a white witness, who realizes the significance of
an oath, is worth ten times as much as an Ovambo’s.”101 This report as
well as the mining chamber’s letter rejected the authority of criminal law
to set the limits of acceptable violence.
One might expect the central administration to support the local
officials in this matter; presumably, they would share a view of the
relation between the public good and the private interests of the mining
companies.
Instead, Heiligbrunner’s solicitation of the colonial
government’s opinion elicited a brusque, strident defense of private
rights. Heiligbrunner wrote that police intrusion into private rights
would be unnecessary if the mines followed the policy they allegedly
espoused, but that criminal law did not provide sufficient protection
against mistreatment as long as the mines persisted in returning abusive
whites to supervisory positions. Oskar Hintrager, employing the same
sort of myopic legal formalism we encountered above, summarily
rejected Heiligbrunner’s view. Hintrager called a police decree
100. Id. at 116r-117r.
101. Id. at 118r-122r.
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mandating the universally preferred policy “legally impermissable.” In
support of this claim, he cited a law that limited the use of administrative
penalties to acts not already punishable under criminal law.102 Although
here silent on the issue, we can assume Hintrager would have contended
that criminal law afforded not only adequate but also the only legitimate
protection to native workers.
A year later, in the spring of 1913, Hintrager still maintained this
position. A Lüderitz district official at that time renewed the complaints
about the mining concerns’ labor practices. The official, a certain
Böhmer, described a recent increase in instances of abuse, ascribing it to
a surfeit of native laborers: “when there are enough workers, they [mine
administrators] no longer believe that they have to pay as much attention
[to mistreatment of natives].”103 Böhmer laid out a detailed argument
against Hintrager’s finding of the previous year, which, Böhmer
objected, “tied the hands” of local officials. Beside dismissing mining
interests’ tactical misrepresentations of the proposed ordinance to restrict
the employment of abusive foremen,104 Böhmer’s argument can be
broken into three parts. First, he explained why criminal process in itself
could not end mistreatment of native workers in diamond mines,
detailing the course of a typical abuse case. “The courts completely fail
to work,” he wrote. When the evidence was damning, the lower court in
most cases imposed a fine, but even this penalty was often overturned on
appeal. Unfamiliar with the diamond mines, the upper court judge could
not understand the conditions that obtained there. Native witnesses,
Böhmer continued, had usually returned home in the “long” interim
between the initial trial and the appeal, so the upper court had to rely on
“the inadequate transcripts of the first trial.” In addition, the defendants
could now shape their arguments to rebut the lesser courts’ findings, an
especially effective strategy given colonial courts’ tendency to give little
credit to native testimony when opposed by the testimony of whites
under oath. “Thus, the case ends with a glänzenden acquittal,” Böhmer
concluded.105
102. Kaiserliche
Verordnung,
betreffend
Zwangsund
Strafbefugnisse
der
Verwaltungsbehörden in den Schutzgebieten Afrikas und der Südsee. Vom 14. Juli 1905 [Imperial
order concerning authority of colonial administrators to punish, July 14, 1905] 9 DIE DEUTSCHE
KOLONIAL-GESETZGEBUNG 171 (1906).
103. Mißhandlung von Eingeborenen durch Weiße, Specialia, ZBU 2054, WIIr2, Bd.1, 156r
(on file with the National Archives of Namibia).
104. The Lüderitz mining chamber routinely represented the suggested ordinance as mandating
the dismissal of abusive whites, for example, while the Lüderitz officials merely called for them to
be transferred to other jobs. Id.
105. Id. at 156v.
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Having discredited the assertion that criminal law and process
afforded native labor ample protection, Böhmer went on to suggest a
legal basis for an ordinance barring the re-employment of abusive whites
in supervisory positions over “natives.” Böhmer would base such a law
in the “today still fully valid” description of police duties in the ALR,
which obliged the police “to take the necessary measures to prevent
imminent dangers to the public or individual members thereof.”106 In a
gloss on this law, the Prussian upper court in a decision on October 15,
1894, had granted police authorities considerable discretion in deciding
when a danger to the “public or its individual members” existed. This
danger could not be an “entirely distant possibility,” but nor did the
police have to wait “until the matter has reached such a point that the
feared occurrence has become imminent.” Quoting this decision at
length, Böhmer argued that a threat to “members of the public and the
common good [Allgemeinheit]” was more than a “distant possibility”
when a known abuser of natives worked as a supervisor. The danger
inherent in such circumstance was “bodily damage” to workers, resulting
in “agitation [Erregung]” among them and endangering the smooth
working of the diamond mines—“thereby causing the greatest harm to
the common good.” To Böhmer’s mind, these conditions justified the
promulgation of a police ordinance.107
In the third stage of his argument, Böhmer tried to refute
Hintrager’s contention that the law (hereafter § 14) forbidding
administrative penalties for criminal acts prohibited a police statute in
the matter. This paragraph simply meant, he contended, “that it is not
the job of the police to protect every individual from the effect of a
punishable actions, but not that the police ought not to protect the public
by preventing the punishable acts of individuals” [emphasis in original].
If § 14 meant as much, continued Böhmer, prevention, the police’s
“most important” function, would become impossible.108 Böhmer’s
repeated references to the common good distinguished his letter from
Heiligbrunner’s of a year before. It is clear that Böhmer included
natives in his definition of the public, since he considered them under
police protection and referred to them several times as among the
“individuals [einzelnen]” who compose the “public [Allgemeinheit].”
Nonetheless, Böhmer seemed reluctant to describe native safety as a
106. Id. at 9 quoting § 10 Allegemeines Landrecht [A.L.R.] II 17 (Prussia). § 10 II. 17 ALR.
The ALR was the “default” law in the colonies when no specific colonial law applied.
107. Mißhandlung von Eingeborenen durch Weiße, Specialia, ZBU 2054, WIIr2, Bd.1, 157v158r (on file with the National Archives of Namibia).
108. Id. at 158v.
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good in itself. Rather, the insecure position of indigenous labor
represented a danger to the colonial economy, harm to which caused the
“greatest damage to the public.” This position may not have reflected
Böhmer’s true beliefs, but rather enabled him to make an argument for
native safety, which would have been rejected out of hand if grounded in
native interests or a humanitarian appeal.
In response to Böhmer, Hintrager acceded to his representation of
the problem: instances of abuse had increased, and the courts were
failing in their prosecution of such cases. Hintrager, in other words, here
contradicted his earlier argument to Roebern that criminal law and the
courts sufficed to protect natives from abuse—the claim also made by
the mining chamber. However, Hintrager still insisted that § 14 allowed
only “direct force in the protection of the population’s life and health,”
which would exclude an ordinance like the one Böhmer proposed.
Instead, in order to redress the worker mistreatment problem, Hintrager
suggested that labor recruiters should no longer place Ovambo workers
at negligent mining companies with the determination of negligence
made by the local Bezirksrat.109 Hintrager avoided answering Böhmer in
terms of the common good, referring instead to the “population
[Bevölkerung],” a group which may or may not have included Africans.
Hintrager’s opinion elicited strong protest from Böhmer.
Hintrager’s suggested solution would not improve the situation, Böhmer
objected. While such a plan might be effective for sanctioning abusive
farmers, it would have little effect on mining concerns. Ovambos were
recruited for all mines as a group, not for individual companies; the
recruiter had no say in how the workers were divided among the mines.
Putting aside the impossibility of impartial judgment by a body largely
composed of “diamond interests,” the Bezirksrat simply was not up to
the administrative task of assessing how each of about 300 white
foremen treated native workers. Expecting the Bezirksrat to perform
this function delegated “a pure police” responsibility onto a “body
formed for entirely other ends”—a body not answerable in terms of civil,
criminal, or administrative law as the police were. Absent a law barring
abusive whites from supervisory positions, the police were “completely
powerless and the district office is then no longer in the position to
assume responsibility for the proper treatment of natives in the field.”110
109. The Bezirksrat was the local organ of South West African system of self-rule. Like their
central counterpart, the Landesrat, it could pass resolutions, but these did not possess the authority
of law.
110. Mißhandlung von Eingeborenen durch Weiße, Specialia, ZBU 2054, WIIr2, Bd.1, 169r170v (on file with the National Archives of Namibia).
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In rejecting Böhmer’s further protestations, the central
administration, this time in the form of Regierungsassessor Kornmayer,
again called upon the restriction on administrative penalties for criminal
acts (§ 14). According to a ruling of the Prussian Upper Administrative
Court [Oberverwaltungsgericht], the police could not impose penalties
for acts already punishable under criminal law. A later decision by the
same court authorized the police to assess fines, not in cases of
individual crimes, but when necessary for “the elimination of the illegal
or unauthorized [polizeiwidrigen] state of affairs caused by them [the
individual cases].” Kornmayer judged, however, that this decision had
not yet been accepted “in the literature,” and besides it was “doubtful” if
this decision included the circumstances at the mines about which
Böhmer and others complained.
Besides, the decisions of the Upper Administrative Court are not based
in . . . a specific law, but rather simply in the belief [Erwägung] that
the police ought not increase through police regulations the
psychological pressure arising from threat of lawful punishment.

A police decree barring abusive foremen from positions overseeing
native laborers would violate § 14 by replicating the StGB paragraphs
concerning physical assault.111
In legal terms, Kornmayer’s opinion returned to the initial defense
of the status quo: native labor was adequately protected by criminal law.
In the eyes of the central administration, criminal law provided not only
sufficient, but also the only protection of natives from abuse allowed
under law. Hintrager and Kornmayer, therefore, represented their
position as deriving from a strict attention to positive law, regardless of
colonial ideologies concerning native social status. But as we have seen,
other interpretations of positive law—namely those of Heiligbrunner and
Böhmer—left ample room for the issue to be decided either way. Legal
formalism functioned here to prevent the problem from being stated
openly, namely the respective value to the common good of native safety
or the relative freedom of whites to mistreat natives. The central
administration steadfastly refused to address the problem in these terms
even when Böhmer’s letters invited it to do so. By refusing to
acknowledge any of the legal precedents proffered by the local officials
and repeatedly invoking § 14, the central administration avoided having
to make, and perhaps recognize, the explicit argument that continued
mistreatment of native labor was preferable to effective sanction against

111. Id. at 171r-172r.
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abusive whites. In fact, it did just the opposite and joined all the
interested parties in lamenting the ongoing mistreatment of native labor.
How do we explain this contradiction?
Again, if we simply look at material or economic conditions of the
colony, neither the mines nor the government gained by acquiescence to
abusive treatment of African labor. Rather, as Böhmer argued cogently,
mishandling of workers would ultimately prove harmful to the mines
and, by extension, the colonial economy. Acknowledgment of this point
accounted for the mining chamber and the central administration’s
blandishments against abuse. For administrators, devotion to the law
itself also may have served as a counterweight to the tuggings of racial
ideology. That is, violating the law, no matter its racial or ideological
valence, transgressed the social order. On the other hand, there seems
little to explain administrators’ and mining interests’ countenancing of
violence toward Africans except as an embrace of a putative racial order
which paired native inferiority with ambivalence about settlers’ violence
against natives. In this ideology’s context, rejection of violence against
natives by those in powerful positions, whether in government or
business, may have represented more distaste at the excesses of (white)
social inferiors than outrage at injustice. Such violence, like the
mistreatment of animals, warranted legal redress only in the most
abhorrent cases.
In the foregoing exchanges, the central administration seemed to
occupy an extreme position virtually identical to that of mining interests.
However, if we take stock of the ideological positioning occurring
alongside this legal and policy debate, we will find that the central
administration actually occupied a moderate position between colonial
reformers and hard-liners. This fact becomes clear in a close
examination of a particular abuse case. The investigation and trials of
August Günther, a mine foremen, prove doubly revealing: they lay bare
the violent reality that underlay the somewhat abstract legal debates and
suggest why the colonial criminal justice system failed to protect
Africans from abuse at the hands of settlers.
The file for the Günther case began with a most unusual telegram
from colonial governor Theodor Seitz. Dated May 28, 1912, and
contemporary to the debates described above, this note demanded an
explanation for the Lüderitz district office’s failure to appeal a previous
abuse case against one Rudolf Stangenberg and ordered it to appeal the
pending case against Günther in the event of acquittal. While it was not
uncommon for the colonial governor to weigh in with an opinion about
judicial administration generally, it was odd for him to offer his views of
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individual cases, all the more so in the Günther case since it had not yet
reached court.
Rather than simply expressing himself on a
administrative matter, the practice of appeal as a whole, Seitz implicitly
imputed guilt to Stangenberg and Günther. Seitz’s action presents an
image of a colonial administration actively seeking to curb abusive
treatment of native labor—an image far different from the one elicited
by the bureaucratic stonewalling described above. Still, Seitz’s stance
accorded in a way with Kornmayer and Hintrager’s views: if the
criminal justice system alone was to protect natives from mistreatment,
it must pursue such cases aggressively, even if after the sort of
aggressive prodding that Seitz did here.
Seitz’s interest in the Günther case prompted revealing attempts by
local officials, now thrown on the defensive, to define their own roles in
the administration of justice and protection of native safety. These
efforts show how the various officials responsible for the realization of
native policy viewed and carried out their roles, and why the colonial
administration and courts ultimately failed to protect Africans from
abuse. Both Heiligbrunner, a Lüderitz official, and Regierungsassessor
Zorn, who acted as state’s attorney in the Stangenberg and Günther
cases, responded to Seitz’s extraordinary intercession. As representative
of the state and the party responsible for pursuing appeals, Zorn’s report
of June 3 revealed a man strenuously defending himself against Seitz’s
implicit criticism of his performance.112 There seemed to be two errors
made by local officials in the handling of the Stangenberg case: the
failure to enter a formal petition to the court [Antrag] in a first instance
of abuse, which also ruled out an appeal, and the lackluster attempt to
prove Stangenberg’s guilt in another instance. Zorn more or less
explicitly placed the blame for these missteps on Native Commissioner
Tönjes, the man who initially complained to Windhoek about the case’s
handling.
Zorn began by arguing that the lack of evidence in one count of
abuse forced him to request a fine rather than imprisonment as
punishment, despite his own conviction that a crime had occurred. The
weakness of the case against Stangenberg resulted from lapses in the
preparation of the case, the responsibility of investigating officials,
namely, the police, the Native Commissioner, and so on. The state’s
attorney, on the other hand, first became active in the case during the
main proceedings [Hauptverhandlung], which included the questioning
112. For the role of the state’s attorney [Staatsanwalt] see WLADIMIR LINDENBERG, RICHTER
STAATSANWÄLTE RECHTSBRECHER: BETRACHTUNGEN EINES SACHVERSTÄNDIGEN 42-25 (1965).
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of witnesses under oath and the judge’s decision. Zorn went on to
explain that he assumed his position in Lüderitz a few months after the
crimes had occurred and had only learned of the case, “apart from,
perhaps, a couple of casual conversations,” seven days before the main
proceedings. He was, therefore, not responsible for the failure to enter a
petition to the court.113 While Zorn was accurate in asserting that the
State’s Attorney was excluded from the pretrial investigation, this fact
did not mean that he had no responsibility for presenting the petition.
The StGB gave anyone over the age of eighteen the right to enter a
complaint, and the author of the handbooks on colonial legal process
asserted that this right extended even to natives.114
Zorn attributed the failure to present sufficient evidence against
Stangenberg to the Native Commissioner’s negligence. Although
Tönjes testified that the defendant had beaten one victim with a “thick
stick, “Zorn said, he did not present this stick as evidence before the
court, so that the court not only disbelieved that the victim had been
struck with a thick stick, but also did not even consider it proven that the
Ovambo had been struck with the thin stick Stangenberg himself showed
to the court. Zorn chided Tönjes for taking the word of the Ovambo
witnesses at face value, noting that in another case they had “lied badly.”
Whereas Zorn had previously cited his ignorance of the case to explain
his failure to file a complaint, now he attributed this failure to the
obligation of the State’s Attorney not to enter a complaint lacking
definitive proof.
Once again in the Stangenberg case, the central evidentiary issue
was the credibility of native witnesses. Zorn criticized Tönjes for basing
his case on such testimony, which in the colonial context amounted to
legal incompetence. However, Tönjes had taken great pains to establish
the credibility of the Ovambo witnesses and, presumably, to make their
testimony acceptable to a skeptical court. These witnesses had been
reluctant to testify when Tönjes first questioned them and denied that
any abuse had occurred. Only after the Native Commissioner asked
113. Mißhandlung von Eingeborenen durch Weiße, Specialia, ZBU 2054, WIIr2, Bd.1, 87r87v (on file with the National Archives of Namibia).
114. See FRIEDRICH DOERR, DEUTSCHES KOLONIALSTRAFPROZESSRECHT 110-11 (1913). The
South West African situation, at least, was not this clear cut. One criticism of the colonial legal
system often made by settlers’ was that Africans could too easily bring complaints against whites.
Since the Native Commissioner was to assume the responsibility of making legal complaints on
behalf of Africans, the creation of this office can be seen as offering something to both settlers and
“natives.” However, it is doubtful that before the appointment of these commissioners that Africans
could very easily or did very often bring complaints against whites, nor is it clear that afterwards
this right was denied them entirely.
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Stangenberg to leave the area did they become more cooperative. Even
then, Tönjes divided the Ovambo workers into two groups and
questioned them separately, testing the honesty of each group against the
other.115 Still, the court summarily dismissed the Ovambo’s story,
underscoring the difficulty in having such testimony considered a
component in the “facts of the case” as construed by the court. For his
part, Zorn could cite the dishonesty of natives and the resultant lack of
evidence because these conditions were axiomatic in the colonial
context.
Coming to the crux of the matter—the implication of incompetence,
Zorn complained that during several discussions Tönjes had given him
no indication of his displeasure with the verdict in the Stangenberg case
before writing to Windhoek. Zorn wrote that he assumed from Seitz’s
telegram that “the Native Commissioner gave an account [of the
situation] that really deviated substantially from the actual development
of the case, although it should not be said that the Native Commissioner
consciously spoke falsely.” As for the Günther case, which was still in
the pre-trial phase, Zorn objected most strongly to the suggestion that he
had been negligent in the Stangenberg case, and he would also prove so
in the Günther case. The Native Commissioner must not be allowed to
trespass on the authority of the State’s Attorney’s Office, an office
which in the performance of any of its duties, Zorn vowed, always
considered natives’ well-being.
In his cover to Zorn’s letter, local administrator Heiligbrunner
seconded the State’s Attorney. Heiligbrunner, who acted as an associate
judge [Beisitzer] during the case, believed there was no definitive proof
that Stangenberg had even once overstepped the limits of the right to
discipline, although Heiligbrunner personally was convinced that he had
done so and that the presentation of more testimony would have brought
about his conviction. He did not place much faith in legal appeals, as it
had been his experience that appeals by the State’s Attorney’s Office
usually brought lighter, not heavier penalties, an effect of the upper
courts’ lay judges’ misunderstanding of the relationship between natives
and whites and the lag time between the first trial and appeal. As for
Günther, Heiligbrunner had asked the Colonial Mining Association to
remove him from his position overseeing native workers, but the mine
had refused to do so unless the court convicted him. In taking this

115. Betriebsführer R. Stangenberg wegen gefährlicher Körperverletzung [Foreman R.
Stangenberg for aggravated assault], Gericht Lüderitz [Lüderitz Court], 3D 23/12, 1r-2r (on file
with the National Archives of Namibia).
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position, the mine pointed to Hintrager’s finding on the matter, which
the mine now interpreted, without demurral by Heiligbrunner, as
forbidding the termination of workers as punishment for “physical
discipline of natives.”
How was the Günther case finally decided? The Lüderitz district
court’s decision on August 7 contained two accounts of the case, the first
based on the testimony of native witnesses and the second on white
testimony. According to the former, Kambali, Gunther’s victim, was
bringing lunch to his fellow Ovambo mine-workers when Günther called
out to him “Wambo, Wambo.” Kambali moved quickly to Günther, who
gave him “four strong boxes on the ear.” Kambali turned to run from his
attacker, but Günther kicked him in the back of the knee and then twice
in the seat of the pants. The Ovambo fell to the ground and then rose
and resumed his flight, whereupon Günther set his dog after him.
Catching up to Kambali, Günther threatened him with a stick but did not
strike him. When he returned to the other Ovambos, Kambali could not
eat, complained of severe pain, and was bleeding from his genitals.
Kambali started on his way to the clinic, but collapsed and a “black
cook” had to help him the rest of the way. All the native witnesses, of
which there were five including the victim, testified that Kambali had
taken no action that could be construed as an attack on the defendant.116
Needless to say, the tale told by Günther and a white witness
differed substantially from this account of the crime. Both described
Kambali as “lazy and rebellious,” citing the complaints made by
Supervisor Smith, the second white witness, against him for
“insubordination and indolence.” Smith had complained to Günther
about Kambali shortly before the incident in question. Smith recounted
that when Günther boxed Kambali’s ears for failing to respond to his
calls quickly enough, Kambali raised his arms in an attempted attack.
(At this point in the testimony, the court cautioned Smith to be truthful;
the decision related that “the witness Smith stood by his story in spite of
the judge’s stern warnings against perjury.”) Another witness standing
about 60 meters away corroborated Smith’s story, claiming “that
Kambali sprung at the accused with raised arms, and that he [the other
witness] understood this as a hostile attack.” Then Günther grabbed
Kambali, spun him around, and kicked him only once in the seat of the
pants. Smith and Günther denied that the latter had kicked Kambali on

116. Mißhandlung von Eingeborenen durch Weiße, Specialia, ZBU 2054, WIIr2, Bd.1, 96v97r (on file with the National Archives of Namibia).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol36/iss1/3

48

Schwirck: Law and Violence in German South West Africa
SCHWIRCK1.DOC

2002]

1/6/03 2:47 PM

LAW AND VIOLENCE IN GERMAN SOUTH WEST AFRICA

129

the knee.117
“Despite considerable misgivings,” the court accepted Smith and
Günther’s account of the event. The court’s open suspicion that the
white witnesses had perjured themselves—indicated by “stern warnings
against perjury” and “considerable misgivings”—was unusual in such a
case. The fact that the court still chose this testimony over the
conflicting account to construct the “facts of the case” again highlights
just how reluctant colonial courts were to believe Africans when their
stories contradicted whites’. This preference for white testimony was
not simply the result of bias, but a product of the very structure of a
colonial legal system that would not allow natives to testify under
oath.118 In the Günther case, the court avoided this issue by reasoning
that Günther’s belief that he was under attack was genuine even if the
attack itself was not. The court, in fact, stated that “a black laborer’s
attack of a white supervisor [Dienstherren] is very unlikely.” The
court’s reasoning rested on two assumptions: that Günther’s boxing of
Kambali’s ears was a legitimate act of discipline (an assumption made
explicit in the decision) and that, therefore, any subsequent attempt by
Kambali to stop Günther was not an act of self-defense but itself an
assault. Through this reasoning, the court tacitly acceded to an aspect of
the Prussian Law of Domestics that we have encountered above, which
considered resistance to discipline to be criminal assault inexcusable by
an appeal to self-defense.119
Still, the court refused to accept Günther’s kicking of Kambali as an
act of self defense, since he turned the victim prior to kicking him and
thereby had already “quite deliberately” removed the danger to himself.
Given the severity of the injury to Kambali, damage to the urethra and
an adjacent artery, the court deemed Günther guilty of deliberate
physical assault [vorsätzlich Körperverletzung]. The court set aside the
mandatory prison sentence and instead found a fine of 400 marks
sufficient punishment, finding, as usual, a number of mitigating
circumstances. The defendant worked with “a difficult and inept
117. Id. at 97r-97v.
118. STENOGRAPHISCHE BERICHTE ÜBER DIE VERHANDLUNGEN DES REICHSTAG, 12.
Legislatur-Periode, I. Session (1907/1909) 7257. Sitzung, March 2, 1909, 7271. Colonial Secretary
Bernhard Dernburg proposed to the Reichstag that Africans be allowed to testify under oath, but his
suggestion was rejected. For settlers’ reactions see Der Negereid [The Black Man’s Oath],
WINDHUKER NACHRICHTEN, July 14, 1909 and Der Negereid nach Dernburgs Anschauung
[Dernberg’s View on The Black Man’s Oath], WINDHUKER NACHRICHTEN, April 17, 1909.
119. Der Negereid [The Black Man’s Oath], WINDHUKER NACHRICHTEN, July 14, 1909, at 56,
and Der Negereid nach Dernburgs Anschauug [Dernberg’s View on the Black Man’s Oath],
WINDHUKER NACHRICHTEN, April 17, 1909, at 31.
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workforce” and was “badly angered by the least imagined attack on the
part of Kambali.” And although the assault might have “easily
endangered” Kambali’s life, the attack did not result in permanent injury
to the victim.120 Under pressure from the colonial administration and
itself skeptical of the white witnesses’ credibility, the court might have
been expected here to impose a prison term. Instead it fell back on a set
of extenuating circumstances—the “natives’” putative nature and the
defendant’s anger—that could and were easily seen as applicable to
many colonial situations.
Just as Governor Seitz had demanded, the state’s attorney, as well
as Günther’s lawyer, appealed the case. And just as Heiligbrunner
predicted, the Upper Court overturned the original verdict and acquitted
Günther. This court’s narrative of the case began with Kambali’s
alleged attack on Günther; it deemed the defendant’s initial attack on
Kambali, the “four strong boxes on the ears,” irrelevant. Now the court
simply had to judge Günther actions “as the result of an unforeseen and,
coming from a native, particularly astonishing attack.” Günther may
have over-reacted, the upper court ruled, but his anger at the time
excused this response. While this account diminished the story’s
coherence, making it seem as if Kambali attacked Günther without
cause, legally it made perfect sense. Because the boxes on the ear were
legitimate corporal discipline, they became transparent to the court.
Superficially, the initial act of discipline was irrelevant to the Lüderitz
court’s decision as well. The court had found it so unlikely that a native
would attack a white that it doubted the witnesses who claimed this had
happened. This approach skirted the corporal discipline issue. Was
Günther’s initial attack on Kambali legitimate discipline?
Was
Kambali’s response, then, self-defense or criminal assault? Instead the
Lüderitz court asserted that no matter what the circumstances or
Günther’s understanding of them, his response to the alleged assault was
excessive. The Upper Court, in direct contrast, found the unprovoked
attack of a native on a white so inflammatory as to justify an excessive
response. Although corporal discipline was not explicitly central to
either court’s decision, ultimately both decisions revolved around this
issue. In convicting Günther, the lower court endeavored to establish the
enforceable limits of discipline, while the Upper Court’s decision
blurred such limits.
As a whole and within each of its parts, the colonial administration
may have sincerely desired to protect Africans from violence at white
120. Id. at 99v-100r.
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hands. Administrators and representatives of mining interests again and
again expressed the belief that the colonial common good and economic
well-being depended on the fair treatment of native workers, and we
have no reason to doubt their sincerity. These arguments also
represented the limited degree to which administrators could advocate
native interests for their own sake. It would have made perfect sense for
colonial actors to sacrifice the jobs of a few abusive white foremen for
the sake of healthier “native relations.” However, administrators and
entrepreneurs seemed unable to make this sacrifice. Given the
reluctance of officials and employers to believe Africans and the
hindrances to the latter making complaints to colonial courts, one reason
certainly was that abuse occurred much more frequently than indicated
by administrative and court records. There were more than “a few”
abusive whites working in the mines. Moreover, even if this were not
the case, structural impediments made it unlikely that any individual
case could be decided in an African’s favor. Individual racial prejudice
certainly played a part, but more important was relative criminal and
civil status of white and Africans under colonial law.
The colony’s civil law as set out by the Schutzgebietgesetz did not
define the civil status of natives. As we have seen above, § 4 of this law
explicitly excluded natives from legal provisions obtaining for whites,
reserving to the Kaiser the authority to make laws for natives. Since
most such laws were restrictive in nature.121 Natives were rightless
under German law. Criminal law might have been a potential exception
to this rightless condition. While as suspected criminals natives did not
have the same protections as whites, e.g., from arbitrary imprisonment,
German criminal law made no explicit distinction between white and
native victims. If one central purpose of criminal law is protection of
life and property, then the criminal law in South West Africa as written
seemed to include native life and property within its scope. However in
practice African lack of civil status undermined their protection under
criminal law and vice versa. One somewhat indirect example, alluded to
above, is the matter of oaths. The prohibition on natives testifying under
oath meant that courts had to grant more credibility to white testimony
even apart from the common characterization of natives as congenital
liars. As a result, in cases with African victims there was no
121. Such laws were exemplified by and culminated in the Native Regulations of 1907, which,
among other things, denied Africans the right to hold property, subjected them to vagrancy and
pass laws, and limited their ability to freely enter into labor contracts. See Verordnung betreffend
Maßregeln zur Kontrolle der Eingeborenen, Vom 18. August 1907, in 11 DIE DEUTSCHE
KOLONIAL-GESETZGEBUNG (Köbner and Schmidt-Dargitz eds., 1907).
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counterweight to the procedural rights of whites. More directly, courts
and administrators explicitly favored the private rights of entrepreneurs
and white workers over African’s tenuous claim to safety under criminal
law, as became clear in the debate about police measures to protect
natives in the mines. Of course, the right to discipline stands as the most
obvious instance of a white civil right weakening the protection of
Africans under criminal law; it redefined a range of criminal activity as a
civil right of white adults vis-à-vis natives. In so doing, the right to
discipline cleared a space in which much mistreatment of Africans could
take place without social or legal sanction.
In colonial Namibia, legal institutions both responded to and helped
shape violence toward Africans by settlers. Many settlers and officials
did not view corporal discipline of Africans as a form violence. By
countenancing this discipline and some of its excesses, legal institutions
effectively distributed the ability to effect legitimate violence while
obscuring its violent nature. In hindsight, we clearly recognize the
violence inherent in the so-called “right to paternal discipline.”
However, our own legal culture may help to obscure and legitimate acts
of violence that are not widely recognized as such. For example,
criminal law constructs violence as an individual’s intentional acts. This
construction disguises the arguably violent nature of preventable harms
people suffer as workers or consumers or of voluntary acts that
contribute to or indirectly cause these harms.122 A detailed, contextually
sensitive analysis of such harms and their treatment by law and legal
institutions is one way to begin to uncover such violence.

122. See John Harris, The Marxist Conception of Violence, 3 PHIL. PUB. AFF. 192, 194-98
(1974) (defining as violent the harms that stem, for example, from “conditions of [persons’] lives
that [ones] work or lack of work forces upon them”).
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